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ARTICLES

DISABLING PATENTABILITY FOR SKILL-BASED
INVENTIONS: ALIGNING PATENT LAW WITH
COMPETITION POLICY
Neeraj Arorat

ABSTRACT

This Article proposes that allowing patents on a new transindustry class of inventions, called skill-based inventions, is harmful
to innovation. Skill-based inventions are defined as those inventions
that rely upon the skill of the user for their efficacy. The primary
argument advanced is that allowing patents on these inventions would
significantly interfere with the natural development of innovation
through competition on the free market. The federal circuit can
surgically bar these inventions from patentability using a reinvigorated version of the § 112 enablement requirement.
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INTRODUCTION

Whereas most provisions of the Constitution were implemented
only after heated debate, the Patent and Copyright Clause was
adopted unanimously.1 Few could question either its laudable goal of
promoting innovation or its tried and true means of achieving that
goal by granting patents. 2 Accordingly, it passed into law as one of
3
the least debated and most supported Constitutional provisions.
The main function of the patent laws is to keep the free market
innovation machine running smoothly. The free market is an arena in
which only those businesses that can provide the best services and
innovative products at the lowest costs will be able to survive.
Patents serve two important functions: first, they ensure that
businesses play fair in this competitive arena by inventing new
technologies rather than stealing them from their competitors; and
second, they force businesses to disclose new innovations in order to
obtain a temporary patent monopoly. However, as the patent laws
have evolved over time the explosion of new patenting activity and
the rigidity of the new patent laws have revealed that the patent laws
can serve as not only a lubricating oil in the great engine of
competition, but as a clotting sludge as well.
The original Patent Office was run by three cabinet officials who
also served as patent examiners. 4 In the first three years of its
existence only 55 patents were issued. 5 Since then, over six million
patents have been issued, and the number increases daily. Intellectual
property has become increasingly important in the new economy. As
with any valuable commodity, as its value has increased, so has the
amount of litigation surrounding its ownership. This litigation, as well
as the offensive and defensive patenting activity that it entails, has
been grinding the gears of the free market innovation machine.
The increase in litigation has also led to the need for a more
formalistic and bright line patent law doctrine. In response, Congress
created the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals to handle all cases
arising under the patent laws. The federal circuit has added a
reliability and predictability to patent law that did not exist before,

1.

DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 17 (3d ed. 2004).

2.
3.
4.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.

5.

See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 19 n.75.
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mainly by enforcing a regime of formalistic rules. 6 At the same time,
patent rights have grown notably stronger since the inception of the
federal circuit, because these formalistic rules necessarily come at the
expense of the flexibility that is necessary to reject technically sound
but conceptually deficient patents. 7 These strengthened patent rights
can deter innovation-producing competition.
As the number and strength of patents has increased so too has
their capacity to interfere with the engine of competition that they
were initially created to augment. To study this issue Congress
commissioned the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to determine
whether patent law was working properly with competition to spur
innovation. In 2003, the FTC released its results, noting that while
patent law as a whole seemed advantageous for innovation, many
commentators expressed concern that there were certain "legal
standards and procedures that ... may have anticompetitive effects
[and] cause unwarranted market power [that could] unjustifiably
increase costs." 8 To address this issue, one of the main
recommendations of the report was for the courts to "consider
possible harm to competition-along with other possible benefits and
costs-before extending the scope of patentable subject matter." 9
This Article considers these issues for an emerging transindustry class of inventions that are making their way into the patent
system. These inventions, which this Article refers to as skill-based
inventions, are those inventions whose efficacy is largely determined
by the skill of the user. They can include, but are not limited to:
business plans, financial tactics, medical procedures and sports
moves. 1 0 Before these inventions become entrenched in the patent
system, it should first be considered whether patents are required to
spur innovation in this area. If such patents are necessary, then their
costs and benefits should be evaluated.
6. See John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U.L. R. 771, 774
(2003).
7. Id. at 771, 773-75; see also R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal
Circuit Succeeding? An EmpiricalAssessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1105, 1116 (2004).
8. Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of
Competition and Patent Law and Policy, Executive Summary, 4-5 (2003) [hereinafter FTC
Report].
9. FTC Report, supra note 8, at 14 (capitalizations removed).
10. This definition is elaborated upon and discussed in detail infra at pp. 32-47. While
skill-based patents can be truly trans-industry, I address them mainly in the context of the four
aforementioned classes. Furthermore, not all inventions that fall into this category are
necessarily skill-based.
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Skill-based inventions represent an area of invention that has
flourished in the absence of patents. Competition in the free market
has been effective in the absence of patents because skill-based
inventions are by their very nature difficult to misappropriate or
conceal from the public. Furthermore, the benefit of patents in this
area is dubious since patent disclosures cannot communicate the skill
necessary to properly utilize the invention. The arguments that this
Article develops ultimately hold that the scope of patentable subject
matter should not be extended to skill-based inventions.
However, even after these policy issues are successfully argued,
patents in this area cannot be denied by the federal circuit unless a
sound legal basis exists. Fortunately, the patent laws already have a
requirement that supports the exclusion of these inventions from the
patent system. The § 112 enablement requirement holds that a
patent's written disclosure must enable a person having ordinary skill
in the art (PHOSITA) to use the invention.11 The written disclosure
of a skill-based invention can never meet this requirement because the
requisite skills needed for a skill-based invention cannot be conveyed
through mere disclosure. As such, the enablement requirement will
never be met and the grant of a patent can always be denied. The
validity of skill-based patents as skill-based patents has not yet been
litigated and therefore the issue is ripe for federal circuit
determination.
This Article develops an argument against the granting of skillbased patents in three parts. Part One explores the roots of innovation
and notes that it is primarily driven by competition. This Part
concludes with a review of the results of several empirical studies
which reveal that patents are only beneficial for innovation some of
the time. Part Two defines the area of skill-based inventions,
explores how competition acting alone can spur innovation and
demonstrates that patents can interfere. Finally, Part Three examines
the legal rules in this area and concludes that the contours of the
enablement requirement support the removal of skill-based inventions
from the realm of patentability.
I. ROOTS OF INNOVATION

The value of innovation in modem society can hardly be
questioned. Scholars have speculated that innovation has lead to at

11.

See infra Part 11.B for the development of this argument.
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12
least a twenty-fold increase in real wages in the past century.
Despite its proven value, the causes of innovation still remain
somewhat of a mystery; one that this Article does not purport to
solve. 13 Instead, this Part is only intended to develop a general
framework that explores how competition in the free market is the
core generator of innovation upon which the patent laws are intended
to function.

A. FirstPrinciplesof Patent Law
Congress shall have [the] Power to... promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors14 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.
Clearly, the mandate of the Patent Clause commands that patent
law and policy should be framed in such a manner as to maximize the
progress of science and the useful arts. Boiled down to its essence, a
principled approach to the patent laws asks the most basic of
questions with regards to the issuance of a patent: would the
technological development of society occur in roughly the same time
frame but for the grant of this patent? 15 When properly applied, this
simple test perfectly operationalizes the constitutional mandate of the
patent laws. 16 Unfortunately, this test can only serve as a meta-tool
12. William J. Baumol, THE FREE MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING THE
GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 53 (2002) [hereinafter FMIM].
13. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 139 (2000) [hereinafter Reconceiving Patents] ("The problem
is, quite frankly, that we don't have a clue how innovation works."). While Professor Lemley's
remarks are an exaggeration, they serve to highlight the conflicting views on the generation of
innovation.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 8.
15. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Commerce and Equivalence: Defining the ProperScope
of Internet Patents Symposium: E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 363, 412
(2005) (stating an efficiency test substantially identical to the "but for" test without being called
such).
16. This form of the "but for" test is different from the one discussed in the FTC report.
See FTC Report, supra note 8, ch. 1, at 10 ("[O]ne could ask whether the claimed invention
would have emerged in roughly the same time frame "but for" the prospect of a patent"). This
Article has tweaked the definition so that patents that conform to the test are always in the best
interest of society. The test as formulated in the FTC report had one flaw, which the report
noted. See id. ch. 4, at 7, n.37 ("[a]n invention worth developing solely because of competitive
advantages conferred by its patent rights could raise exclusionary concerns, yet would pass
through a 'but for' screen"). By reformulating the test it can be made to consider the overall
benefits and harms of a patent relative to the world sans that patent. This consideration
necessarily includes the costs associated with exclusionary tactics, along with any and all other
costs and benefits of the patent. Therefore, this reformulated "but for" test by definition can
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for analyzing patent law because the conceptual nature of the test
17
makes it impossible to apply on a case-by-case basis.
Although impossible to apply in every case, this test must serve
as the guiding principle for the formulation of patent laws. The test
requires that patents be issued only where they will improve the
technological development of society. Inherent in this standard is the
idea that patents must be evaluated not only for the benefits that they
bring but also for the costs that they impose on the natural
competitive process.
The main benefit of the patent laws is to deal with the nonexhaustible and non-excludable nature of information. As a nonexhaustible good, the use of information by more than one person has
no cost. This is precisely why the spillover benefits from information
are so high and can lead to explosive economic growth.
As a non-excludable good, information cannot be fenced off in
the way of land or other tangible goods. This creates an
appropriability problem in which it becomes difficult for innovators
to recover the costs of invention. Patent laws mitigate this problem
by allowing innovators to legally exclude others from using their
invention for a limited amount of time so that they may recoup their
costs and even extract a profit.
In solving the appropriability problem, the patent laws are used
to create four main incentives. 18 First, they create the incentive to
invent by allowing inventors to reap the possibly substantial returns
from their invention for a limited period of time. Second, they create
the incentive to disclose innovation to society, by requiring disclosure
of an invention as part of the patenting process. Third, they create an
incentive to commercialize an invention. The patent laws allow the
initial inventor to commercialize their invention without fear of
misappropriation, and they allow the inventor to easily transfer their
invention and allow someone else to bring it to market. Finally, the

never allow for the issuance of a patent which results in an efficiency loss for society. When the
"but for" test is referred to in this Article, it will be referring to the definition as it has been
reformulated here.
17. Id. ch. 1, at 11. This is especially true of the reformulated "but for" test I have
proposed here since this test performs all of the work of an ideal patent law. Professor Lunney
also attempted to transform the obviousness requirement into a modified version of this test.
While his idea certainly shed light on the way we would like our obviousness requirement to
function, the obviousness test is not capable of shouldering this hefty burden alone and his test
could not be adapted because it was nearly impossible to apply. See Lunney, supra note 15, at
413 (Professor Lunney used the creative investment fraction as a proxy for the "but for" test).
18. See CHISUM, ET AL., supra note 1, at 66-71 for a general discussion.
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patent laws create an incentive to innovate by forcing new inventors
to design around pre-existing patents. 19
By giving inventors the right to exclude, the patent laws also
reduce transaction costs by solving Arrow's paradox. The paradox
can be seen from both the perspective of a buyer and seller of an
invention. A buyer of an invention does not know the value of the
invention until they have had a chance to evaluate it, but they cannot
evaluate the invention without first acquiring it. A seller cannot trust
a buyer to evaluate their invention for fear that the buyer may
misappropriate it. Patent rights solve this paradox by giving an
inventor the right to exclude the buyer. Should the buyer refuse to
live up to their end of the bargain, the seller can enforce their patent
in court and recover steep damages.
The patent laws are not without their costs. The most obvious
harm they cause is preventing the widespread use of information. By
their very nature, non-exhaustible goods are most efficient in the
short-term when they are utilized by all, because the costs of
reproduction are trivial. By giving the right to exclude, patents
necessarily prevent inventions from being put to their value
maximizing usages.
This is not the only way that patents can impose costs on society.
Patents also impose secondary costs that vary through different
industries and categories of invention. 20 Some categories, such as
business methods, may be prone to bad patents because of the
inexperience of the PTO in those areas. 2 1 Patents that are used for
purely strategic defensive or offensive purposes may damage some
22
industries, such as the computer hardware and software industries.
As will be discussed infra, strategic patents can drive up transaction
costs and thereby deter innovation. In order for the patent laws to

19. As the expense and occurrence of patent litigation has increased, this feature of
competition can also stifle creative activity. Inventors may be deterred from designing around
inventions by the threat of litigation. Even if the lawsuit has no chance of success, the expense
of defending against the lawsuit can be enough to deter innovation.
20. See FTC Report, supra note 8, at ch. 3, 1; W.M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or
Not) (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at
http://papersdev.nber.org/papers/w7552; Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns
from Industrial R&D, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 783 (William C.

Brainard & George L. Perry eds., 1987). For a general discussion of the secondary harms of
patents, see Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 247, 249-53 (1994).
21. See FTC Report, supra note 8, ch. 4, at 39-40.
22. See id. ch. 3, at 30-56.
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achieve their constitutional mandate, patent policy must carefully
weigh both the primary and secondary costs of patents against their
benefits. 23 Only then will patents be able to properly augment the
main driving force of innovation: competition on the free market.
B. Innovation through Competition
While patent policy plays an important role in creating
incentives for innovation, it is not the primary source of innovation.
Competition plays the dominant role in encouraging innovative
activity. 24 Patents serve as an overlay on the baseline of free
competition, not vice versa. 25 Competition has been credited with
being the root cause of the explosion of economic growth to which we
are all beneficiaries. 2 6 In contrast, the existence of benefits from
patents is not so certain. A study commissioned by the U.S. Congress
in 1958 concluded, in the words of one prominent scholar, "if we
didn't have a patent system, it would be irresponsible to create one,
but since we have one, it would be irresponsible to eliminate it. '' 27
This is not to say that patents are useless, for they can limit free riding
on others' innovations in a way that other protective regimes
cannot; 28 it is only to point out that the importance of competition to
our economy requires that we fashion our patent policy with the
utmost care. 29
This Section explores the various ways that
competition can spur innovation in different market structures and by
different functional classes. The first Subsection explores competition

23. See id. Executive Summary, at 14.
24. See, e.g., Cohen etal., supra note 20 (noting that patents were only helpful for discrete
inventions); Levin et al., supra note 20 (noting that patents were not necessary in most
industries); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An EmpiricalStudy, 32 MGMT. SCIENCE
173 (1986) (this survey of twelve industries and 100 firms found that patents were essential only
in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries).
25. Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989) (noting that free
exchange of obvious and non-novel ideas is the baseline upon which the patent law depends).
26. See, e.g. FMIM, supra note 12, at I ("The capitalist economy can usefully be viewed
as a machine whose primary product is economic growth. Indeed, its effectiveness in this role is
unparalleled.").
27. Reconceiving Patents, supra note 13, at 139 (citing STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, 85TH CONG., AN ECON. REVIEW OF THE PATENT

SYSTEM: STUDY NO. 15, at 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup)).
28. FTC Report, supra note 8, ch. 2, at 3 ("Patent rights mitigate [free riding] by granting
exclusive rights in innovations, enhancing appropriability.").
29. See, e.g., id. at 8 ("This economy is founded on the privilege to compete. That is the
fundamental, bedrock principle of our capitalist economy ....We simply must be very
concerned when we manipulate out markets to restrain competition.") (internal quotations
omitted) (citation omitted).

2005]

DISABLING SKILL-BASED INVENTIONS

9

in the context of various market structures. The next Subsection
addresses some positive and negative features of competition in its
role as a generator of innovation.
Before beginning this discussion, it is useful from the outset to
distinguish the two main functions of competition: setting prices and
spurring innovation. Both of these aspects of competition can suffer
harm as a result of patent policy. An overbroad patent policy can not
only reduce the efficacy of competition in spurring innovation, as will
be described infra, but can damage the ability of competition to find
the socially optimal price for goods. In order for competition to
function properly as a price setter, patent policy should provide
exactly enough incentive for inventors to create socially beneficial
inventions; nothing more and nothing less. In the ideal balance of
patent incentives and this type of competition, a reduction of
incentives would cause the inventor to quit inventing and put his
talents to other uses, and any more incentives would allow the
inventor to extract additional monopoly rents that are a loss to
30
society.
This Section focuses on the ability of competition to spur
innovation. 3 1 Joseph A. Schumpeter has remarked:
[I]n a capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it
is not [price] competition which counts but the competition from
the new commodity, the new technology.., competition which
commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes
not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing
32
firms but at their foundations and their very lives.
So long as consumers are attracted to innovative products, firms
must compete with each other to innovate. Innovative firms can
appropriate the gains from their innovations using a variety of tactics,
one of which is patents. The others include first-mover advantages,
learning curve advantages, complementary sales and service efforts,
and secrecy. 33 Firms that are capable of effective innovation are able

30. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 60-61 (noting that overbroad patents which
reduce available substitutes allow for the extraction of monopoly rents).
31. For a discussion of the competition which drives innovation, as distinguished from
competition which sets prices, see generally 4 PROFESSOR DR. F. DE VRIES LECTURES IN
ECONOMICS: THEORY, INSTITUTIONS, POLICY (1982).
32.

JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,

CAPITALISM,

SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 84 (3d. ed.

1962). This paper does not evaluate Schumpeter's ultimate conclusion that oligopolistic
competition is required to generate innovation. Only his description of competition as a
dynamic force is adopted.
33. See FTC Report, supra note 8, at 11.
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to both transform and take over markets. Those firms that are not
able to keep up with the innovation of their competitors will face
34
extinction.
1. Competition in Varied Market Contexts
In a market structure where there are many firms, these firms
must compete with each other not simply in terms of price, but in
terms of innovation. Firms that cannot innovate and offer improved
products will not survive in this environment. As firms begin to
compete with each other through innovation simply to survive, they
are forced to incorporate innovation into their routine production
35
processes.
[Firms] simply cannot risk reliance on the fortuitous appearance of
new ideas, often contributed unpredictably by outside sources, and
as likely to be offered to other enterprises as to themselves. These
firms feel forced to incorporate the generation of new techniques
and new or improved products as a critical part of their day-to-day,
routine operations. It is built into the company's organization and
budgeted like any other activity. 36
This sort of routine innovation comprises the bulk of innovation
37
spending in the United States.
As firms begin to conventionalize innovation, the race for R&D
can become an escalating arms war that drives firms to invest more
and more money into R&D. 38 This process has been detailed in
34. See GERHARD ROSEGGER, THE ECONOMICS OF PRODUCTION & INNOVATION: AN
INDUSTRIAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (2d ed. 1996).
35.
technical
closer to
36.

See FMIM, supra note 12, at 30 ("[F]irms have increasingly taken over the process of
change, transforming it from a fitful and uncertain discovery process into something
a routine internal matter.").
See id. at 32; see also ELIEZER GEISLER, CREATING VALUE WITH SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY 4 (2001):

Once the link between the R&D function of the firm and its commercial side was
firmly established, innovation became a recognized force in corporate success
and in its market competitiveness. Moreover, this recognition was not limited
only to major corporations, but filtered down to smaller companies, who then
adopted this same attitude toward research, science and technology.
37. See FMIM, supra note 12, at 34 ("Nearly 70 percent of the United States R&D was
paid for by private firms in 1998, and industry accounted for an even larger share of R&D
performance - close to 75 percent in 1998."); See also Riding the Innovation Wave: The Case
for Increasing Business Investment in R&D, 7 Australian House of Representatives, Standing
Committee on Science and Innovation (2003) (noting that in 2000-2001 2.04% of the 2.72% of
GDP dedicated to R&D came from private business in the United States), available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/scin/randd/report/chapter2.pdf
(last visited Apr. 4,

2005).
38.

See generally FMIM, supranote 12, at 45-51.
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microeconomic terms by Professor Baumol. He notes that this
process causes firms to increase their R&D spending, and a ratchet
mechanism prevents firms from decreasing their spending. 39 The
process works as follows: Firms will spend as much on R&D as their
competitors. 40 However, once a firm achieves a particularly
promising line of research it will increase spending on R&D. 4 1 Other
firms will follow suit, but no firm can retreat for fear of being pushed
out of the market. 42 Innovation spending can only rise, since firms
increase spending in competition with each other, and the ratchet
43
mechanism prevents the level of spending from decreasing.
Even in a monopoly situation, competition can be useful in
spurring innovation. The high rates of return enjoyed by the
monopolist can induce competitors to pay high entry costs in order to
steal the market from the monopolist. 44 The monopolist, in turn, will
devote money to R&D to innovate its products and protect its market
position, even if this results in its new products cannibalizing sales
away from its old products. 45 In fact, a monopolist may have greater
incentive to invest in R&D because they stand to lose much more than
a prospective entrant. 46 As Schumpeter put it, "[c]ompetition of the
kind we now have in mind acts not only when in being but also when
it is merely an ever-present threat. It disciplines before it attacks. ''4 7
The mere threat of competition can force a monopolist to spend
money to erect barriers to entry.
Monopolists will advance
innovation of their products so that they can continue to obtain
48
monopoly rents.

39. Id.at 50.
40. Id.at 47; see also GEISLER, supra note 36, at 6 ("Following the examples of corporate
giants.., other manufacturers formed and institutionalized their R&D activity as an on-going
function of these companies.").
41. FMIM,supra note 12, at 48-49.
42. Id.at 50.
43. Id. at n.8. (Professor Baumol does acknowledge that the ratchet is not perfect and
innovation spending can in some circumstances decrease. However, he claims the ratchet will
provide powerful resistance against the decrease of innovation spending).
44. See FTC Report, supra note 8, ch. 2, at 9.
45. Id. A notable example of this phenomenon is Microsoft. Oftentimes, Microsoft
products are not replaced by the products of another company, but by newer generations of
Microsoft products.
46. Id. at 9-10 ("[T]he monopolist that does face a threat of entry may have more
incentive to invest in R&D than a prospective entrant would have, because the monopolist may
have more to lose from entry than a potential entrant has to gain.").
47. SCHUMPETER, supra note 32, at 85.
48.

See CRISTIANO ANTONELLI, THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION, NEW TECHNOLOGIES

AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE, 116 ("The introduction of product innovation able to target well-
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Competition also disciplines monopolies by forcing reinvestment of their monopoly rents into their products. 4 9 Firms will
spend profits on innovation until they arrive at the equilibrium price
where marginal profit equals marginal return. Firms that do not do so
may fall behind in the innovation race. Competition can thereby force
money back into R&D rather than allowing companies to extract
monopoly rents. Empirical data supports the idea of this ratchet
mechanism and the feedback of money into R&D. "Industry funding
of R&D in the United States (in constant 1992 dollars) nearly
quadrupled between 1970 and 1998 (increasing from about $34
billion to nearly $133 billion in constant 1992 dollars)." 50
Competition may be stopped from driving down monopoly rents
where barriers to entry protect a firm. 51 Barriers can exist in the form
of high sunk costs, which prevent competitors from moving into the
industry. 52 However, barriers to entry can also exist in the form of
overbroad patent rights. 53 Furthermore, the patent holder can use
their patent rights to threaten expensive litigation, which may deter
venture capital financing and allow the patent holder to maintain their
54
societally inefficient position.
2. Features of Competition
Competition provides the proper incentives for both follow-on
and initial innovations. 5 5 In addition to large firms and monopolies,
the proper competitive incentives can also mobilize small inventors
and entrepreneurs into the competitive fray. 56 Sometimes these types
defined product-niches and to match the specific requirements of the groups of consumers can
secure a fraction of the general demand curve for well-identified products and generate relevant
mark-ups.").
49. FMIM, supra note 12, at 32.
50. Id. at 34.
51. Id. at40.
52. Id.
53. See FTC Report, supra note 8, ch. 2, at 7 ("The creation of a patent monopoly can
'lead[] to restriction of production, a supracompetitive price, and what economists call an
efficiency or deadweight loss."') (citing Dam, supranote 20, at 248).
54. See FTC Report, supra note 8, ch. 2, at 8. See also, e.g., Josh Lemer, Patenting in the
Shadow of Competitors, 38 J. LAW & EcON. 463, 465, 489-90 (1995) (finding that high
litigation costs deter biotechnology firms from seeking patents when rivals already hold
patents).
55. See FTC Report, supra note 8, at 8 ("Like patent policy, competition plays an
important role in spurring the development of technologies and sequences of related, follow-on
technologies.").
56. See FMIM, supra note 12, at 61 ("How entrepreneurs act at a given time and place
depends heavily on the prevailing.., reward structure in the economy.").
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of inventors may be responsible for more than their share of initial,
groundbreaking inventions. 5 7 The free market in conjunction with
patents provides the possibility of vast returns on new technology and
thereby can properly incentivize these individual and small
innovators. 58 Even large companies can be lured into making new
groundbreaking initial innovations by the possibility of huge
59
returns.
In fact, the nature of a competitive market is such that it can
enlist innovation from a number of sources. Unlike a centrally
directed economy, a free market can generate innovation from sources
that are not traditionally thought of as innovative. Not only
manufacturers, but users, distributors, suppliers, repairers and "[a]ny
functional class" can be a "potential source of innovation."' 60 So long
as these sources can appropriate enough gains from their innovation
to offset their costs, they will innovate. 6 1 Some of these sources may
have lower innovation costs than others because they may be in a
better position to generate innovation than others. 62 The net result is
that competition causes increased innovation at efficient prices.
Another beneficial feature of competition is that it can result in a
diversity of innovation. The diversity of innovation can prove very
beneficial as competitors may explore areas that would be neglected
in a centrally directed research effort. 6 3 This feature is more important
64
where research paths are highly unpredictable.
57. See id. at 56 ("One can even offer the plausible conjecture that most of the really
revolutionary new ideas have been, and are likely to continue to be, provided preponderantly by
independent innovators.").
58. See id at 63 ("[N]ever before has productive activity been so effective and prestigious
as a method for the attainment of wealth, power, and prestige."); accord Jay Dratler, Jr., Does
Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software and Business-Method Patents, 43 SANTA
CLARA L. REV 823, 848 (2003) ("Only the hope of... a major pioneering invention[] and...
earning potentially unlimited returns[] can provide strong enough motivation for accepting real
risks of total loss.").
59. See FTC Report, supra note 8, ch. 2, at 9 (noting that large firms will even cannibalize
their own products in hopes of achieving market power).
60. See ERIC VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION, 4 (1988).
61. Id. at 70.
62. See, e.g., id at 11-27 (in certain industries, such as scientific instruments, users are
better situated to innovate the products because they are constantly using them and can tailor
them to their needs).
63. See FTC Report, supra note 8, ch. 2, at 15 ("[W]hen many firms devote R&D efforts
to tackling the same problem, the public benefits."); see also Daniel Rubinfeld & John Hoven,
Innovation and Antitrust Enforcement, in DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND PUBLIC POLICY 65, 8788 (Jerry Ellig ed., 2001) (diversity of innovation is beneficial).
64. See FTC Report, supra note 8, ch. 2, at 15-16; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents
and the Progressof Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017,
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Like patent law, competition also has certain features that can be
detrimental to innovation. However, unlike patent law, these features
are limited in number and effect and easily offset by the benefits of
competition. For example, as various competitors vie to get ahead of
each other, most notably in the context of patent races, they can spur
each other to work too hard and too fast. 65 Some commentators have
looked upon this diversity of research as a wasteful duplication of
effort. 66 Others have speculated that it can be inefficient because it
leads to investments in innovation before these newer innovations are
properly utilized. 6 7 The damage of these races may be especially
exacerbated in the patent context, where firms race to invent the same
thing. 6 8 However, other scholars have looked on this competition in a
positive light. 69 They note that this same sort of duplicative activity
70
occurs regularly in a competitive market when businesses compete.
Another possible weakness of competition is that it may cause
too much innovation too quickly. New competitors may introduce
products in the market that render older products from other
competitors obsolete before those products have been able to recoup
their development costs and before the potential gains from those
products has been fully realized. 7 1 Generations of new products can
render old product lines obsolete in a process that Schumpeter has
referred to as "creative destruction. ' '72 Firms are happy to wreak this
evolutionary chaos on markets in order to realize the supernormal
profits that early innovators can obtain in a competitive market. Of
course the same competitive market will reduce these profits once
new innovators move into the market, and firms will have to
continually innovate to stay ahead of the pack, resulting in even more
creative destruction. 73 The accelerated process of creative destruction

1066-69 (1989) (when research may follow unexpected paths a diversity of research may be
especially beneficial).
65. See FTC Report, supra note 8, ch. 2, at 10.
66. See FTC Report, supra note 8, ch. 2, at 13; see also Mark F. Grady & Jay I.
Alexander, Patent Law andRent Dissipation,78 VA. L. REV. 305, 308 (1992) (competition can
lead to wasteful overinvestment in innovation).
67. Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348, 354
(1968).
68. See id.
69. See id; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 873, 877 (1990).
70. See Merges & Nelson, supranote 69; Dam, supra note 20, at 263.
71. See FMIM, supra note 12, at 137.
72. See ROSEGGER, supra note 34.
73. Id.
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contains a negative externality that may be harmful to overall
innovation "[b]ecause the creators of innovation and those who suffer
the resulting (creative) destruction are different individuals or
groups." 74 The owners of the old products take massive losses as a
result, resulting in a net loss to society. 75 However, it is unclear
whether this actually leads to overinvestment in innovation. Given
the massive societal spillovers from innovation, it is hard to imagine
76
that there is such a thing as too much innovation.
While it is obvious that competition has a net positive effect on
innovation, it is unclear how much it is impeded or assisted by the
patent laws. The benefits and harms of competition appear to vary
throughout different industries. 77 The next section reviews empirical
studies of the efficacy of competition and patent policy in various
industries.
C. Empirical Studies
Empirical studies across the board show that the meld of
competition and patent law required to create the optimum level of
innovation varies through different industries. Competition was
always required to achieve a high level of innovation in all industries.
In two industries, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, patents were
needed. 78 Despite the fact that many industries did not require patent
rights to spur innovation, when patent rights were available
79
companies generally would secure them.
The reason patent protection is required in those two industries is
to appropriate gains from innovation. In different industries, there
For
were other, more efficient means of appropriating gains.
example, patent protection was not as effective as secrecy, lead-time,
learning curve advantages, and sales and service efforts. 80
In the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, patents are
81
necessary to prevent free riding on innovative breakthroughs.
74. See FMIM, supra note 12, at 137.
75. Id.
76. See FMIM, supra note 12, at 137-38.
77. See FTC Report, supra note 8, ch. 2, at 8-9 ("[E]conomic theory and empirical
evidence suggest that the effect of an increase in competition on innovation will vary from on
context to another.").
78. See, e.g., Mansfield, supra note 24, at 180 (this survey of twelve industries and 100
firms found that patents were essential only in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries).
79. See id.
80. See Levin et al., supra note 20, at 816.
81. See FTC Report, supranote 8, at ch. 3, 1-2.
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Unlike other industries, products in biotechnology and pharmaceutical
companies take a long time to develop and require a massive amount
82
of resources, both to develop and ready for commercialization.
Therefore, the consequences of misappropriation are heightened for
these industries. In addition, in the biotechnology industry patent
disclosures can also serve as a useful source of research for the
83
inspiration of design around innovation.
The computer software and hardware industries do not share
those attributes that make patent protection valuable. Low upfront
costs, the predictability of product development, quick pace of
technological change, and alternate regimes of intellectual property
protection make patent protection unnecessary. 84 In the computer
hardware industry, trade secret was found to be a far superior
mechanism than patenting. Since companies would have a hard time
determining if a competitor was copying their technology, they found
that they were much better off by simply keeping their technology a
secret. 85 While competitors could reverse engineer their products, the
fast pace of the industry assured the original developers that they
would appropriate the majority of the gains from their innovations. In
the software industry, copyright offers an alternate regime for
software protection. The longer duration of protection, cheaper costs,
and predictability make it an attractive regime in that industry.
Furthermore, patent disclosures are not useful to software developers
because the disclosure of source code is not required. 86
In fact, in the computer software and hardware industries the
ease with which patents can be obtained can actually be harmful.
Innovators complain that their development efforts are stifled because
of both the amount of time they have to spend examining prior
patented art and navigating around said prior art. 87 This is especially
so because a majority of the innovation that occurs is follow-on
innovation. The threat of litigation generated by the plethora of
patents can also deter would-be innovators. 88
The effect of patents also varies within industries. For example,
in the computer hardware manufacturing industry, specialized design

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id. ch. 4, at 15.
See id.
See FTC Report, supra note 8, ch. 30, at 44.
See id. at 32.
See id. at 49-50.
See id. at 51-53.
Seeid. at51.

2005]

DISABLING SKILL-BASED INVENTIONS

17

89
firms noted that patent protection is helpful to spurring innovation.
A specialized design firm could be one that designs computer
semiconductors but contracts with semiconductor foundries to have
their products manufactured. 90 In this sub-industry patents are used
to protect critical business assets and are enforced against infringers.
This example illustrates that it is possible for innovation in an
industry as a whole to be impeded by patents, even though patents
may still help innovation in a small subset of that industry.
This brief discussion of empirical studies of patents reveals that
while competition is always necessary to spur innovation, the effects
of patents vary across industries, and even within industries.
Therefore, restricting patentability by industry may not be effective.
Instead, patents should be barred for a category of patents in which all
patents are harmful to innovation.

II. SKILL-BASED INVENTIONS
The preceding section illustrated that there are many situations in
which the patent laws conflict with the workings of competition to
cause a loss of efficiency for society. These problems exist because
there is a tension between the constitutional mandate of the patent
system and the statutory and common law scheme that has been put in
place to operationalize it. To some degree this conflict is inevitable.
As was stated supra, the "but for" test that could perfectly carry out
the mandate of the patent system is impossible to apply on a practical
level and can only serve as a theoretical guidepost. The statutory
scheme enacted to carry out the mandate of the patent system must
necessarily sacrifice some conceptual purity so that it may be applied
on a practical level.
However, it can be argued that the statutory scheme may be
sacrificing too much in order to achieve its formalistic ends. Some
have complained that it has turned into little better than a registration
system for patents. 9 1 The difficulty lies in finding a way to properly

89. See FTC Report, supra note 8, at 34.
90. See id. at 32-33.
91. Some have even speculated that a registration system may be more effective. See
generally F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of
Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003). Also, some have argued that it is
not worth the cost of reforming. Mark Lemley has argued that the United States Patent and
Trademark Office's issuance of patents that do not adequately meet patentability standards does
not cause enough economic harm to warrant the expenditure of additional resources for the
purpose of increasing patent quality, because only a very small portion are ever licensed or
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reform the system. Removing patent protection from entire industries
does not seem to be an effective solution since, as mentioned above,
sometimes a sub-industry of a particular industry may rely heavily on
patent protection to spur innovation even though the industry as a
whole does not. 92 While there are certain industries that seem to
suffer as a whole from patent protection, there are still inventions
within those industries that undoubtedly promote the aims of the
patent system, even if patents in the industry as a whole fail.
The key to reforming the system therefore lies in finding a transindustry category of inventions that includes only those patents that
fail the "but-for" test and which can be excluded from the system in a
manner that comports with the formalistic requirements of the federal
circuit. This can be done by finding a category of invention that by
its very nature is heavily dependent upon competition for
development and does not easily lend itself to patent protection.
Skill-based inventions comprise one such category, because skillbased inventions are heavily dependent upon competition between
skilled competitors for development, and skills do not easily lend
themselves to patenting. The next Section lays out the boundaries of
this category.
A. Defining Skill Based Inventions
Skill based inventions are, as their name implies, inventions
based upon the skill of their users, such as a method of shooting a
basketball. They normally involve a method for doing something
where the method requires a considerable amount of skill, and where
the results from usage will directly vary based upon that skill. It is
this last distinction that truly sets them apart from other inventions.
Most inventions require a baseline level of skill to be used and
will yield the same results so long as this baseline level of skill is
used. Unlike normal inventions, the results from the usage of skillbased inventions vary directly with the skill of the user. This
enforced and the federal courts are better equipped to assess patent validity in depth. Mark A.
Lemley, Rational Ignoranceat the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495 (2001).
92. As mentioned above, in the computer hardware industry, in which many firms
complain that patent protection is damaging as a whole, semiconductor design firms depend
upon patent protection for their existence. See FTC Report, supra note 8, ch. 3, at 34. See also
John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 987, 1004 n.48 (2003) ("If there are serious problems with the quality of U.S. patents, they
appear to be systemic rather than specific to a certain technology."); accord Dan L. Burk &
Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575, 1634 (2003) ("Even if
industry-specific patent legislation is legal, however, we are not persuaded that it is a good
idea.").

2005]

DISABLING SKILL-BASED INVENTIONS

19

distinction has been captured in the more formal definition: Skillbased inventions are those inventions whose efficacy is substantially
determined by the skill of the user, and not inherent in the invention
itself; or those inventions which act primarily as gatekeepers to the
aforementioned types of inventions. The second prong of the
definition, the gatekeeper prong, covers those inventions that are not
themselves skill-based inventions, but act primarily to cover the use
of a skill-based invention. This second prong is fleshed out in more
detail once the first prong is explained.
Patents on typical inventions assume that the user has a baseline
level of skill. This concept has manifested itself in the form of a
Person Having Ordinary Skill In The Art, or a PHOSITA. A
PHOSITA is assumed to be acquainted with all of the prior art. 93 The
concept of a PHOSITA is entirely distinct from the concept of a skillbased user. A PHOSITA typifies the baseline level of skill needed to
obtain a predictable result from any patented invention. A skill-based
user, on the other hand, typifies a person who uses a skill-based
invention and obtains different results based upon their skill level.
An example will help to illustrate this definition more precisely.
Imagine that we have an invention on a method of putting a golf
ball. 94 Imagine that we also have a patent on an improvement on a
golf club. The first would be a skill-based patent because the efficacy
of a golf putt using the patented technique would depend substantially
upon the skill of the user. The second invention, an improvement on
a golf club, would not be a skill-based invention. The efficacy of the
golf club is not determined by the skill of the user. The typical
response to this is that the golf club would be more effective in the
hands of a better user. However, this conflates usage of the golf club
with the golf club itself. No matter who the user of the club is, the
improvement on the club (the invention at issue) is always the same.
This differs from the golf swing, where the same invention is actually
different when employed by different users.
The main problem with the first prong of this definition is that a
clever patent drafter can get around it by obtaining a patent on the
apparatus used to perform the skill-based invention. The second
prong of the definition addresses this problem. It captures those
inventions which act primarily as gatekeepers for skill-based

93. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, Co., 745 F.2d 1437, 1453-54 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
94. This is not actually so far from reality, as this patent actually exists. See U.S. Patent
No. 5,616,089 (filed Mar. 29, 1996) (issued Apr. 1, 1997) ("Method of putting").
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inventions. The word "primarily" is used here for two reasons. First,
as mentioned above, it captures those inventions that are only
attempts to get around the first prong. Second, it does not capture
those inventions that contribute a large measure of value to the skillbased endeavor.
This part of the definition requires the most subjective
evaluation. The main difficulty revolves around determining whether
something "primarily" acts as a gatekeeper. This apparent ambiguity
can be partially resolved by considering three additional factors.
First, was there a significant amount of research and development that
went into the invention? The greater the costs of development, the
more likely that the invention does not act primarily as a gatekeeper.
Second, does the particular form of the apparatus require the use of
the skill-based invention? If an exact form is necessary, this means
the invention probably had independent value and is not primarily a
gatekeeper. Finally, how much does the invention independently
contribute to the efficacy of the skill-based invention? The more it
contributes, the more likely the invention is not primarily acting as a
gatekeeper. To evaluate this last prong, one may consider the amount
of skill required for proper use of the invention. The greater the level
of skill required, the more likely that this is a gatekeeper. However, it
should be kept in mind that these factors cannot stand-alone and
95
require some level of balancing.
A brief example can show the difference in context, and also
point out the gray area. An invention that has no other purpose but to
act as a gatekeeper might be a regular stick that is to be used for some
skill-based purpose. Imagine there is a patent on a method of using
the stick to hit a ball, and the efficacy of the hit is largely determined
by the skill of the user. Imagine that the stick has been patented in
conjunction with the method of hitting, and that nearly any stick will
accomplish this purpose. Here, the patent on the stick is clearly an
attempt to patent the skill-based invention and will be barred by the
gatekeeper prong. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the
stick will also fail the three evaluative factors: (i) it required little
R&D, (ii) the exact form of the stick is not important, and (iii) it
contributes little independent value to the invention.
On the other hand, an invention can act as a gatekeeper and have
independent value, and therefore be patentable. For instance, there is
95. For example, consider an improved tennis racquet. Only the most skilled may be able
to fully utilize the invention, but the invention is clearly not skill based because the
improvement on the tennis racquet is always the same, no matter who is using the invention.
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a medical procedure patent on surrogate embryo transfer. This
process was extremely expensive to develop and it was ultimately
developed by Fertility and Genetics Research, Inc. (FGR). 96 To
perform the procedure FGR developed a catheter-like instrument to
facilitate the process and attempted to patent the device. 9 7 Assuming
that this process is in fact a skill-based invention, the catheter-like
instrument is still not a gateway to a skill-based invention. The three
factors mentioned above gravitate towards a finding that the invention
is not primarily a gatekeeper. The invention required extensive R&D,
the particular form the invention is vital, and the apparatus at issue
contributes value to the skill-based endeavor.
It is the gatekeeper prong that will require the greatest amount of
discretion and development by the courts. Of course, it would be
preferable to have a bright line test that could be mechanically
applied. However, a rigid test will never be sufficient because patent
law deals with the flexible and ever-changing world of inventions and
ideas. Instead, the quest should be to find the test that introduces the
least amount of discretion for the most amount of innovative gain.
B. Patentson Skill-BasedInventions and Competition
Before the scope of patentable subject matter is expanded to a
new category of inventions, the benefits and harms to competition
This Section examines how
should be carefully examined. 98
competition operates to create innovation in this area without the aid
of patents. It then explores how patents might interfere with this
innovation generation.
1. Innovation by Competition
Competition already provides incentives for skill-based
inventions without patent protection because the rewards for
innovation can generally be appropriated without the use of
Skill-based inventions are also generally
intellectual property.
difficult to copy effectively, since by their very nature, they require a
certain degree of skill. This difficulty of imitation can serve to help
96. Andres Rueda, Cataract Surgery, Male Impotence, Rubber Dentures and a Murder
Case- What's So Special About Medical Process Patents? 9 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 109,
134 (2001).

97. Id.
98. This inquiry comports with the recommendation of the FTC's report. See FTC
Report, supra note 8, at 15 ("For future issues, it will be highly desirable to consider possible
harms to competition that spurs innovation-as well as other possible benefits and costsbefore extending the scope of the patentable subject matter.").
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the initial inventor appropriate gains from their technology. 99 One
study found that for most industries "lead time, learning curve
advantages, complementary sales or service efforts, and secrecy were
all more effective means of protecting the competitive advantages of
new processes than patents were." 10 0 This idea is analogous to the
common reality of sports, where the first athlete to introduce a sports
move will have a learning curve advantage over their competitors.
Similarly, the first industry to implement a successful business plan
will be rewarded with the income from a successful business. 10 1 In
the medical and scientific communities there has been ample work
done within an incentive structure, which oftentimes is based on peer
esteem. 102
Furthermore, allowing patents on skill-based inventions would
do little to spur innovation. The empirical studies detailed supra
demonstrated that for most industries patent protection was not
required to spur innovation. 103
The two exceptions were
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. These industries were dependent
upon patent protection because of the steep upfront costs and the ease
with which technology could be misappropriated. 104 Skill-based
inventions have exactly the opposite qualities. They have low upfront
costs and are difficult to misappropriate because they require the
development of a skill to be utilized properly. Accordingly, it seems
unlikely that they will benefit from protection.
2. Costs to Competitive Development
As a preliminary issue, it should be noted that patents in this area
do not confer a great deal of benefit to society. The disclosures from
patents on skill-based inventions have a very limited utility since the
skill that is necessary to properly utilize the invention cannot be
conveyed to a new user through disclosures. Accordingly, these
patents would give the inventor a monopoly without giving society a

99. See FTC Report, supra note 8, ch. 2, at 10, n.74.
100. See id.at 11 (citing Levin et al., supra note 20).
101. See id.ch. 4, at 43 ("[C]ritics argued that business method patents do not foster
incentives to innovate, because business methods traditionally evolve in response to competition
and internal business needs, without regard to legal rights to exclusivity.").
102. See, e.g., THE ECONOMICS OF SCIENCE AND INNOVATION I,PART IV, THE REWARD
STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE (Paula E. Stephan & David B. Audretsch eds., 2000).
103. See Levin et al., supra note 20 (noting that patents were not necessary in most
industries).
104. See Levin et al., supra note 20.
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commensurate benefit in return, all the while harming competition in
the manners discussed next.
Patents on skill-based inventions can be particularly harmful to
innovation because innovation in this class is so dependent upon
competition. Competition is so vital because it drives players to
improve their skills and to improve their techniques. Those who
cannot successfully keep up with the pace of competition must either
drop their prices considerably or be forced out of the market
altogether.
Patents in this area would be devastating to this sort of
competition. A skill-based invention by definition is one whose
efficacy is largely determined by the skill of the user. 105 Patents
would be harmful here because the overall efficacy of the endeavor is
substantially determined by skill, but patents would divert rents from
the skilled to those who simply thought of the invention. It is much
easier to conceptualize a new sports move than to execute it to
perfection. The same theory applies to business plans; great ideas for
new products are a dime a dozen, but it is the execution of these ideas
that separates the truly great entrepreneurs. Thomas Edison famously
06
noted that genius is 1%inspiration and 99% perspiration.1
This damage is compounded because patents would make it
more difficult for users to obtain new technology. In a free market,
"any functional class" can generate innovation. 10 7 The functional
class that is most likely to generate innovation is the class that has the
most incentive to do so. 108 In the case of skill-based inventions, the
users of the invention will be the class with the most incentive to
innovate. Users of the inventions will naturally spend considerable
time practicing and therefore gaining significant expertise in the
invention. If they find a way to improve the invention, they stand to
make considerable gains via competitive advantage. Patents on
inventions will restrict the flow of skill-based inventions to users who
could provide further innovation. The natural development of skills
and innovative techniques that flows from the constant competition
between champion and challenger would be stifled.
Many of the areas that would be covered by patents on skillbased inventions have not traditionally received patent protection.

105.

See discussion in Part A, supra.

106. Wikipedia, Thomas Edison - 7.4 Work Relations,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ThomasEdison (last visited on Nov. 3, 2005).
107. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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The sudden introduction of patents could introduce new costs as the
norms of the affected industries adjust. Traditional methods for the
quick dissemination of skill-based inventions may be destroyed due to
the patent system. For example, publishing articles not only provides
prestige to researchers, but also quickly disseminates new information
to the community. In sports and finance, the incentive to compete
forces athletes and financiers to use and thereby divulge their latest
techniques. 109 Entrepreneurs are also driven by the same incentives,
and they have the additional incentive to disclose in order to obtain
venture funding. 110 In situations where information is not normally
divulged, traditional rules surrounding trade secret can protect the
rights of inventors.1 1 1
The introduction of patents may also result in other problems,
such as the use of patents for strategic purposes. This problem is
amplified with skill-based inventions because they contain broad
claims. 112 One notorious example of this in the medical community
occurred with Josiah Bacon, who came to own a patent on the
technique of inserting vulcanite rubber dentures in the mid-nineteenth
century, although the technique was already widely practiced. 113 For
years, he exploited this patent to the tune of nearly $700,000 annually,
a hefty sum at the time. He continued this practice until he eventually
met his early demise at the hands of an outraged dentist. 114

109. Douglas L. Price, Assessing the Patentabilityof FinancialServices and Products, 3 J.
HIGH TECH. L. 141, 153 (2004) ("Historically in the financial industry when someone invented
a new financial product or method it was openly copied, used, and improved by others in the
industry.").
110. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad For Business?, 16
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 263, 275 (2000):
But neither the free-rider nor the disclosure rationale justifies business method
patents. Businesses are largely practiced in public. Accordingly, there is little
need to especially encourage disclosure .... In sum, while business innovations
are certainly desirable, it is not clear that business method patents are needed to
spur people to create them.
111. See, e.g., Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, 926 P.2d 1130, 1140-45
(Alaska 1996) (holding that damages in breach of contract and tort exist for the
misappropriation of trade secrets).
112. See, e.g., FTC Report, supra note 8, ch. 4, at 41 ("[P]anelists expressed concern that
business method patents will contain claims that encompass every manner of implementing a
particular business model."); Keith E. Maskus & Eina Vivian Wong, Searching For Economic
Balance in Business Method Patents, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 289, 292 (2002) ("[M]any
patents cover remarkably broad claims that could permit patentees to exclude competition in a
wide swath of Internet applications ....
).
113. See Rueda, supra note 96, at 109-10.
114. See id. at 109-12.
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The nature of the technology at issue also introduces special
licensing problems. When the licensing of patents occurs with low
115
transaction costs, inventions can be sold to the most efficient users.
Unfortunately, the transaction costs for skill-based inventions are very
high because skill-based inventions are by their very nature difficult
to value. A buyer or a seller does not know how valuable a skillbased invention is because they cannot know how effectively it will
be used. Further, a bargaining breakdown can occur because skilled
users may be unwilling to pay for patent rights for something that
they rightly see as substantially based upon their own skills. This can
prevent intellectual property from reaching its most efficient usage.
Another problem is the difficulty and high cost associated with
Intellectual property lawyers
monitoring skill-based inventions.
would be forced to monitor everything from business models and
transactions to sporting events and medical procedures. Allocating
these costs could pose another roadblock to licensing and hamper the
flow of goods to their most valued usage.
The transaction costs would be amplified by the difficulty in
defining the patented invention. Potential infringers would never be
sure if their skill-based activities were indeed infringing a patent.
Publicly subsidized courts and privately supported arbitrators would
likewise encounter difficulty in adjudicating potential disputes. These
problems could be compounded by groups who purposefully use
116
ambiguous language in hopes of capturing broader inventions.
Ultimately, these sorts of costs would have to be borne by society at
large and would hinder innovative activity.
III. PATENT LAW DOCTRINE
Even if it was proven beyond the shadow of a doubt that skillbased inventions are both harmful to innovation and a perfectly
delineated category of invention, the federal circuit could not deny
them patent protection unless it had some doctrinal ground upon
which to stand. This Part addresses the legal issues surrounding skillbased inventions. The first Section of this Part explores the current
stance of the federal circuit towards skill-based inventions. The next
Section then provides a doctrinal basis to accomplish their exclusion.
115. See FMIM, supra note 12.
116. See Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1144-49 (2003) (discussing how problems in communicating property
rights can impose costs on third-party enforcers, potential violators and market participants in
general).
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A. The Bounds of Patentability
Skill-based patents are currently patentable under the statutory
scheme as it has been construed by the federal circuit and interpreted
by the PTO. The PTO's interpretation of the federal circuit's
construal has stretched the bounds of patentability to the limits of
humankind's endeavors. One scholar has sarcastically questioned if
there are even any bounds remaining by pointing out that we have
allowed patents on language, the fine arts, and theology. 117
The current patent statute requires that in order to be patentable,
an invention must be patentable subject matter, useful, novel,
nonobvious, and disclosed in its best mode in a fashion that allows for
it be enabled by a PHOSITA. 118
The utility and novelty requirements do not serve as powerful,
flexible bars to patentability for skill-based inventions. In order to
satisfy the utility requirement, a patent applicant need merely show
that the invention has a "useful" application. 119 This requirement is
usually not much of a hurdle except in the case of chemical or
pharmaceutical inventions for which no use has yet been found. 120
The novelty requirement likewise does not pose a bar to patents on
skill-based inventions because it can only bar pre-existing
inventions. 121
The statutory subject matter requirement, though at one time a
significant bar to skill-based inventions, functions now to bar only the
most abstract of inventions. Patentable subject matter includes any
"process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" 12 2 and the
Court has interpreted this broadly to include "anything under the sun
that is made by man."' 123 Following the lead of the Supreme Court,
the federal circuit has further emaciated this section by declaring that
117. See U.S. Patent No. 4,864,503 (filed Feb. 5, 1987) (issued Sept. 5, 1989) ("Method of
using a created international language as an intermediate pathway in translation between two
national languages."); U.S. Patent No. 5,730,052 (filed Mar. 11, 1996) (issued Mar. 24, 1998)
("Method of high resolution silk screen printing."); U.S. Patent No. 5,734,795 (filed May 15,
1995) (issued Mar. 31, 1998) ("System for allowing a person to experience systems of
mythology."). See also John R. Thomas, The Patentingof the Liberal Arts Professions,40 B.C.
L. REv. 1139, 1163-64 (1999).
118. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112 (2001).
119. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).
120. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 735.
121. In order for an invention to be barred on novelty grounds, every claim of the new
invention must exist in a single prior art reference.
122. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).
123. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citations omitted); see also
Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 154 (1989).
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1 24
any process is patentable so long as it is applied in a "useful way".
Given this narrow reading, the subject matter requirement now serves
to bar only natural phenomena, mental processes or abstract concepts
125
that have not been applied to produce a useful result.
I will argue infra that the enablement requirement can be used to
effectively bar skill-based inventions from patentability. However,
since the federal circuit has not yet ruled on this issue the PTO has not
used the written description or the enablement requirement for this
purpose.
The requirement that carries the largest burden of
operationalizing the mandate of the Patent Clause is the
nonobviousness requirement. However, it is ill suited to serve as a
bar to skill-based inventions because it was meant to exclude patents
that did not represent a sufficiently significant technological leap
forward, not to exclude patents based upon the skill of the user
involved.126
In relevant part, the nonobviousness section states:
A patent may not be obtained.., if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
127
to which said subject matter pertains.

"Nonobviousness asks whether a development is a significant
1 28
enough technical advance to merit the award of a patent. 1
The nonobviousness requirement has not been able to bar skillbased inventions because it was not tailored for that purpose and is
difficult to apply. The judicial test for its interpretation is convoluted
at best, consisting of a three-pronged test with attendant secondary
considerations. 129 Applying the test requires determining the scope
and content of the prior art, ascertaining the differences between the
124. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U. S. 1093 (1999).
125. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185-86 (1981). An abstract concept can be patented
as part of an invention which produces a useful result. See, e.g., id at 187 ("It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.").
126. See P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New PatentAct, 75 J. Pat. Trad. Off. Soc'y 160,
179-80 (1993) ("An invention which has been made, and which is new in the sense that the
same thing has not been made before, may still not be patentable if the difference between the
thing, and what was known before is not considered sufficiently great to warrant a patent.").
127. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2001).
128. See FTC Report, supra note 8, at 10.
129. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18(1966).
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prior art and the claims at issue, and then evaluating whether one with
ordinary skill in the pertinent art would have automatically bridged
that gap. 130 Secondary considerations include "commercial success,
131
long felt but unsolved needs [and] failure of others.'
Particularly problematic is the standard for determining whether
a PHOSITA would combine prior art references to create the
invention at issue. This is resolved using the "suggestion test. ' 132 In
a move towards formalism, the federal circuit has required that in
order for an invention to be deemed obvious, there must be an explicit
or strongly implied notion in the prior art calling for the combination
of the elements of the invention. 133 The federal circuit has required
this test because allowing judges to speculate on whether a PHOSITA
would combine existing elements to create the invention without an
explicit prior art reference raises the possibility of a highly subjective
34
and unpredictable hindsight bias. 1
By choosing the more formalistic test the federal circuit has
chosen predictability over conceptual flexibility, which can have the
effect of letting in many marginal patents. However, had the federal
circuit chosen otherwise, it would have sacrificed some of the
135
predictability that it was mandated to bring at its inception.
Tweaking the nonobviousness requirement by modifying the
suggestion test has almost become a zero-sum game; what is gained
in requiring a larger innovative advance is lost in predictability, and
vice versa. Barring skill-based inventions using the nonobviousness
requirement is like attempting to use a star-shaped cookie cutter to

130. See id. at 17.
131. Id. at 18. Others cases have also included the licensing activity on a patent as a
secondary consideration.
See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson
Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
132. See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that there must be
some "suggestion" in order to combine prior art references and find an invention obvious)
(questioned on other grounds).
133. See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999.
134. Studies have confirmed the existence of a hindsight bias in the legal context. See
Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 799-805 (2001);
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 99 (Cass Sunstein ed. 2000); Russell Korobkin & Thomas
S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1095 (2000). This problem has not gone unnoticed by the
federal circuit in the obviousness context. See, e.g., In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) ("Our case law makes clear that the best defense against the subtle but powerful
attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness analysis is rigorous application of the requirement
for a showing of the teaching or motivation to combine prior art references."); Al-Site Corp. v.
VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
135. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 7, at 1116-17.
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make a circular cookie - the contours of the requirement do not fit
properly, and forcing the issue will necessarily be messy and
imprecise.
The next four Subsections review how these requirements have
applied to skill-based inventions across various industries.
1. Business Methods
The field of business method patents has grown so large that it
encompasses novel business plans. The pendulum of patentability has
swung strongly in this domain since the early twentieth century when
the second circuit in Hotel Security v. Lorraine Co. disallowed a
patent on a method of doing business. 136 In that case, the second
circuit held that a method for account balancing designed to prevent
fraud by workers in hotels and restaurants lacked novelty and
therefore could not be patented. Although decided on novelty
grounds, that case was widely read as barring patentability for
business methods patents because the court in dictum stated "[a]
system of transacting business disconnected from the means for
carrying out the system is not, within the most liberal interpretation of
137
the term, an art."
The flimsy foundation of the exception ultimately came back to
haunt it and led to its demise. In the dissenting opinion to In re
Schrader,Judge Newman blasted the exception, stating:
I discern no purpose in perpetuating a poorly defined, redundant,
and unnecessary 'business methods' exception, indeed enlarging
(and enhancing the fuzziness of) that exception by applying it in
this case. All of the 'doing business' cases could have been
decided using the clearer concepts of Title 35. Patentability does
not turn on whether the claimed method does 'business' instead of
something else, but on whether the method, viewed as a whole,
meets the requirements of patentability as set forth in Sections 102,
103, and 112 of the Patent Act. 138

136. See Hotel Secruity Checkings Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467,469 (2d Cir. 1908).
137. Id. at 469. Subsequent cases upheld the idea of a business method exception. See,
e.g., Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547, 552 (1st Cir. 1949)
(holding that system of parking cars in an open lot to maximize viewing of a movie screen was
not patentable subject matter); Commentators on the patent law also perceived the existence of a
business method exception. One commentator stated that there is a "long-standing rule that
abstractions, mental theories or business methods are not patentable subject matter." Editorial
Notes, The Patentabilityof PrintedMatter: Critique and Proposal, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
475,476 (1950).
138. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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The strength of her argument loosened the lid on the exception to
such a degree that Judge Rich was able to blow it off with minimal
effort in State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. SignatureFin. Group, when he
139
unambiguously "[laid] this ill-conceived exception to rest."
Since that decision, the PTO has been flooded with business
method patents. 140 Some business method patents, like US Patent No.
6,101,483, "Personal shopping system and portable terminal," seem
uncontroversial. Others, however, strain the limits of credulity, as
they seem little more than business plans. For instance, Priceline.com
has a patent on a "[m]ethod and apparatus for a cryptographically
assisted commercial network system designed to facilitate buyerdriven conditional purchase offers."' 14 1 This patent basically preempts
a business plan of an Internet website which facilitates reverse
auctions for goods. In October of 1999, Priceline.com filed suit to
enforce its patent against Expedia.com. 142 Walker Digital proudly
proclaims "we... take our core ideas, protect them with patents and
,,143
establish licensing partnerships with major industry players ....
At one point, this would have sounded the death knell for
patentability, but instead Walker Digital's business model has
become, rather ironically, the idea for other companies. 144 Some
139. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U. S.1093 (1999).
140. The number of Class 705 patents filed and issued has increased substantially since
1998, the year that State Street was decided. See Class 705 Application Filing and Patents
Issued Data at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pbmethod/applicationfiling.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2005).
141. U.S. Patent No. 5,794,207 (filed Sept. 4, 1996) (issued Aug. 11, 1998); two
commentators have pointed to the Priceline.com patent as having had a positive affect on the
industry because it "lured hundreds of millions of investment dollars to finance its attempt to
practice its business methods." Jeffrey R. Kuester & Lawrence E. Thompson, Risks Associated
with Restricting Business Method and E-Commerce Patents, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 657, 682
(2001). Ironically, Priceline.com was subsequently the subject of a securities fraud action
brought by its shareholders. See In re Priceline.com Inc., 342 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D. Conn 2004).
The venture capital raising feature of business method patents that has been lauded by numerous
commentators (see, e.g., Reconceiving Patents, supra note 13, at 144-45) is a double-edged
sword: whatever economic gain that patents bring by allowing for ease of venture backing must
be balanced against the harm of facilitating overly aggressive financing.
142. See Expedia Seeks To Dismiss Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1999 at C22.
143. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 583
(1999).
144. For example, one commentator speculates that Howard Lutnick, a holder of many
financial patents, and "his fellow early adopters may be following in the footsteps of
Priceline.com's founder Jay Walker [and] Mr. Walker's intellectual property incubator, Walker
Digital." See Paul E. Schaafsma, A Gathering Storm in the FinancialIndustry, 9 STAN. J.L.
Bus. & FIN. 176, 188 (2004).
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patentees no longer even pretend that they are not patenting a
business plan disguised as a business method. For instance, one
particularly bold patent proclaims this in its title, "System, method,
and business model for speech-interactive information system having
business self-promotion, audio coupon and rating features."' 145 In
response to the deleterious effect this patenting could have on preexisting businesses, Congress passed the First Inventor's Defense Act
in 1999. This law includes a prior user exception for business
inventors who have been using an invention for over a year before a
14 6
patent is filed.
This does not mean that all business method patents are skillbased inventions. 147 In fact, the definition used here only captures
two types of business method patents: business plans and business
methods-patents that primarily act as gatekeepers to business plans.
Business methods fall into the skill-based category because the
success of a business largely depends upon the expertise of the
executor of the business plan. A great business plan executed poorly
is a recipe for disaster.
Patents that are obvious business plans would include the patent
discussed above, a "[s]ystem, method, and business model for speechinteractive information system having business self-promotion, audio
coupon and rating features. ' 148 Also included in this group would be
legal plans, such as tax shelters or poison pills. The efficacy of these
plans is so highly dependent upon the lawyers that implement the
details that these must fall into the category of skill-based inventions.
An example of a patent that acts as a gatekeeper would be the
apparatus claims of the Priceline.com patent on an Internet reverse
auctioning site. 149 While an apparatus cannot actually be a business
plan, in this case it is clear that the apparatus is claimed primarily to
exclude others from the business plan at issue. A business method
patent that would not be included in this class would be "[s]ystem and
145. U.S. Patent No. 6,658,389 (filed Mar. 24, 2000) (issued Dec. 2, 2003).
146. 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2001).
147. In this regard, the exclusion of skill-based patents will accomplish a significantly
different end than that proposed by the Business Method Improvement Act of 2001, H.R. 1332,
107th Cong. (2001), which would have overruled State Street in some measure and created a
presumption of invalidity for all business method patents. That bill was ultimately defeated and
faced strong opposition from parties who claimed that business method inventions should not be
treated differently from any other class of inventions. See Russell A. Kom, Comment: Is
Legislation the Answer? An Analysis of the ProposedLegislationfor Business Method Patents,
29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1367, 1376-86 (2002).
148. U.S. Patent No. 6,658,389 (filed Mar. 24, 2000) (issued Dec. 2, 2003).
149. U.S. Patent No. 5,794,207 (filed Sept. 4, 1996) (issued Aug. I1, 1998).
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150
method of displaying information by an electronic price label"'
because this invention solves a narrowly focused problem irrespective
of the skill of the user.
In a thorough study of business method patents, Professors
Allison and Tiller separated Internet patents into three distinct
categories. 15 1 One category is Internet business models and, as its
name implies, is comprised largely of methods of doing business on
the Internet. 152 Inclusion in the category of skill-based patents is due
to their reliance upon the skill of the business owner. Another
category, they created is a class of patents that were "narrower in
153
scope" and only intended to "solv[e] a specific business problem."
These are not skill-based patents since their efficacy is in no way
based on the skill of the user and they do not act primarily as
gatekeepers for an invention that does. Their third category of
Internet related patents is comprised of patents that could be described
as Internet software technique patents. 154 Because these patents are
more focused on solving a software problem than acting as a business
plan or gateway to a business plan, they are not included in the
category of skill-based patents.

150. U.S. Patent No. 6,859,786 (filed Mar. 23, 1999) (issued Feb. 22, 2005).
151. See Allison & Tiller, supra note 92, at 1034-36.
152. Id. at 1035. The following patents were included in this class: the Priceline.com
patent just mentioned, U.S. Patent No. 6,006,265 (filed Apr. 2, 1998) (issued Dec. 21, 1999)
("Hyperlinks resolution at and by a special network server in order to enable diverse
sophisticated hyperlinking upon a digital network") (essentially digital video with hyperlinks);
U.S. Patent No. 6,009,412 (filed June 25, 1998) (issued Dec. 28, 1999) ("Fully integrated online interactive frequency and award redemption program") (essentially internet shopping with a
rewards program); U.S. Patent No. 5,978,780 (filed Nov. 21, 1997) (issued Nov. 2, 1999)
("Integrated bill consolidation, payment aggregation, and settlement system") (essentially, an
online bill payment system).
153. Allison & Tiller, supra note 92, at 1035. These include the now infamous
Amazon.com one-click patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411, (filed Sept. 12, 1997) (issued Sept.
28, 1999) ("Method and system for placing a purchase order via a communications network");
U.S. Patent No. 6,006,332 (filed Oct. 21, 1997) (issued Dec. 21, 1999) ("Rights management
system for digital media") (essentially, a method of controlling access to copyrighted works
over the internet); U.S. Patent No. 6,009,382 (filed Sept. 30, 1996) (issued Dec. 28, 1999)
("Word storage table for natural language determination") (essentially, a method of distributing
a document in the user's language).
154. Allison & Tiller, supra note 92, at 1035-36. Internet software technique patents
include U.S. Patent No. 6,003,077 (filed Sept. 15, 1997) (issued Dec. 14, 1999) ("Computer
network system and method using domain name system to locate MIB module specification and
web browser for managing SNMP agents"); U.S. Patent No. 6,005,939 (filed Dec. 6, 1996)
(issued Dec. 21, 1999) ("Method and apparatus for storing an Internet user's identity and access
rights to world wide web resources"); Professors Allison and Tiller admit that distinguishing this
last category from Internet business techniques can be difficult. Since both Internet business
techniques and Internet software techniques are not included in the category of skill-based
patents in my analysis, this difficulty in distinguishing them does not pose a problem.
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2. Financial Patents
State Street was decided during the height of the "dotcom"
frenzy, and, as such, was perceived as a decision that opened the door
for many Internet patents. 155 However, State Street actually dealt
with a financial product and it had the effect of opening the door for
financial patents, although the financial community remained largely
unaware of this fact. 156 However, as more and more financial
products become patented, lawyers are now advising their clients to
both examine their systems for infringement as well as defensively
157
patent their own systems.
Walker Digital has also jumped into the fray, once again
patenting ideas in the hopes of licensing them to (perhaps
involuntary) partners. 158 Others, such as Howard Lutnick, head of
Cantor Fitzgerald, have followed suit.159 In a race-to-the-bottom
response, major companies such as Merrill Lynch, Chase Manhattan,
Citicorp Life Insurance and General Electric have waded into the
patent frenzy. 160 Their collective portfolios include:
" Method and Apparatus for Processing Checks to
1 61
Reserve Funds
* Stock Option Control and Exercise System1 6 2
" System for Managing Real Estate SWAP
Accounts 16 3
* Supply Chain Financing System and Method1 64
" Method and Formulating an Investment Strategy for
65
Real Estate Investment1
Universities have also followed suit with patents such as
166
"Method and System for Securities Pool Allocation."
155. See Schaafsma, supra note 144, at 183-84.
156. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d 1368, involved U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056
(filed Mar. 11, 1991) (issued Mar. 9, 1993) ("Data processing system for hub and spoke
financial services configuration"); See also Schaafsma, supra note 144, at 184 ("Since the
publicity surrounding [State Street] focused on e-business applications.., the financial
community remained generally unaware of the expanding applicability of patents.").
157. See Price, supranote 109, at 158-59.
158. See Schaafsma, supra note 144, at 188-89.
159. Id. at 187.
160. Id. at 188-92.
161. U.S. Patent No. 6,282,523 (filed June 29, 1998) (issued Aug. 28, 2001).
162. U.S. Patent No. 6,269,346 (filed Aug. 31, 1999) (issued July 31, 2001) and U.S.
Patent No. 6,173,270 (filed Sept. 23, 1997) (issued Jan. 9, 2001).
163. U.S. Patent No. 5,950,175 (filed Oct. 14, 1994) (issued Sept. 7, 1999).
164. U.S. Patent No. 6,167,385 (filed Nov. 30, 1998) (issued Dec. 26, 2000).
165. U.S. Patent No. 6,564,190 (filed Dec. 30, 1999) (issued May 13, 2003).

34 SANTA C1ARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 22
Although State Street may have opened the floodgates for
patentability of financial products, litigation had already begun on a
smaller scale much earlier. In 1983 a federal district court ruled that a
patent on a Cash Management Account ("CMA"), 167 was valid
because it "[taught] a method of operation on a computer to effectuate
a business activity." 16 8 The court did limit the case, however, by
noting that the same invention would not have been patentable if it
was implemented by hand. 169 Thus limited, the lower court decision
did not generate near the amount of press and patenting activity as the
broad State Street decision. After State Street, the press took notice,
and this has opened the door to many more business patents.
This aggressive patenting has led to expensive licensing activity
through the threat of litigation. Mopex, Inc. obtained patents for an
"open end mutual fund securitization process" 170 and used them to
demand a license fee of approximately $20 million per year from the
American Stock Exchange. 17 1 Electronic Trading Systems Corp.
employed a similar strategy with a patent for an "Automated Futures
Trading System, ' 172 which netted them over $10 million dollars from
each the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange. 17 3 The combination of the lucrative financial industry, the
quick feeding frenzy on patents, and the high stakes litigation may
contribute to a hugely inefficient "storm" of patent activity in the
174
financial industry.

Like business method patents, not all financial patents are skillbased inventions. Essentially, financial inventions that would yield

consistent

results

with

different

users

are

not

skill-based.

166. U.S. Patent N6. 5,563,783 (filed Apr. 4, 1995) (issued Oct. 8, 1996); for a more
complete list of companies and patents that have issued, and also that have been filed, see
Schaafsma, supra note 144, at 187-91.
167. U.S. Patent No. 4,346,442 (filed July 29, 1980) (issued Aug. 24, 1982).
168. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
564 F. Supp. 1358, 1369 (D. Del. 1983).
169. Id.
170. U.S. Patent No. 5,806,048 (filed Oct. 12, 1995) (issued Sept. 8, 1998) and U.S. Patent
No. 6,088,685 (filed Aug. 27, 1998) (issued July 11, 2000). These patents deal with a financial
instrument known as "Select Sector Spiders" which hold shares of certain industry segments of
the S&P 500 and are traded on many Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs). See Schaafsma, supra
note 144, at 186-87.
171. SeePrice,supranote 109, at 154-55.
172. U.S. Patent No. 4,903,201 (filed Nov. 3, 1983) (issued Feb. 20, 1990). This patent
covers electronic futures trading systems. See Schaafsma, supra note 144, at 184-85.
173. See Schaafsma, supra note 144, at 184-85 (in addition to the large settlements there
were less expensive licenses granted to also smaller, but still significant licenses issued).
174. See generally id
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Accordingly, the following patents would not fall in the skill-based
invention category: "Method and Apparatus for Processing Checks to
Reserve Funds" 175 and "Method and system for automated document
generation." 176 Patents that are used to predict the values of stocks
are generally not dependent upon the skill of the user because they
yield the same valuation no matter who uses the program. However,
the following patents are dependent upon the skill of the user and so
would fall into the skill based category: "Investment company that
issues a class of conventional shares and a class of exchange-traded
shares in the same fund"; 177 "Method and system for creating a
portfolio of stock equities"; 17 8 "Method and apparatus for taxefficient investment using both long and short positions"; 179 and
"Method for investing working capital." 180
Hard cases involve patents like the one at issue in State Street:
"data processing system for hub and spoke financial services
configuration." The data processing system was used to allow mutual
funds to pool their assets in an investment portfolio organized as a
partnership. This invention is difficult to categorize because it acts as
a gatekeeper to a skill-based invention; namely, a variety of mutual
funds organized as a partnership. The partnership arrangement is
skill-based because the efficacy of the partnership depends largely
upon the skill of the organizers. However, the claimed invention is
not the partnership arrangement itself, but rather an apparatus to
implement the invention. The hard case arises when the question is
whether the primary function of the system at issue is to act as a
gatekeeper, or whether the invention has independent value. In
making this determination the three factors mentioned above (costs of
development, importance of the form of the invention, and the
independent value contribution of the invention) should be
considered. The court will have to pay close attention to the
individual facts of each case to draw this line properly.
3. Medical Procedures
Medical procedures were not originally patentable in the United
States. In 1862, the validity of a patent for the administration of

(filed June 29, 1998) (issued Aug. 28, 2001).
(filed Dec. 13, 1999) (issued Mar. 29, 2005).
(filed Mar. 7, 2001) (issued Apr. 12, 2005).
(filed Oct. 30, 1998) (issued Jan. 4, 2005).
(filed Oct. 6, 1999) (issued Dec. 14, 2004).

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

U.S. Patent No. 6,282,523
U.S. Patent No. 6,873,992
U.S. Patent No. 6,879,964
U.S. Patent No. 6,839,685
U.S. Patent No. 6,832,209

180.

U.S. Patent No. 6,795,811 (filed Apr. 26, 2000) (issued Sept. 21, 2004).
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ether, one of the earliest anesthetics, was litigated. 181 Despite the fact
that the court noted that the use of ether was one of the "great
discoveries of modem times," 182 it nonetheless held that the patent
was invalid. The court ruled that in order to be patentable, the
principle idea behind an invention must "be embodied and set to
work" and that "[n]either the natural functions of an animal upon
which or through which it may be designed to operate, nor any of the
useful purposes to which it may be applied can form any essential
parts of the combination, however they may illustrate and establish its
usefulness."' 183 This logic was later used by the PTO in Ex Parte
Brinkerhoff to hold that a method for the treatment of hemorrhoids
84
was not patentable. 1
The situation changed in 1954 when the PTO reversed itself by
holding that medical treatment methods are indeed patentable. 18 5
Since then, the PTO "has routinely issued patents for medical
procedures."' 186 Cedars-Sinai Hospital holds patents on procedures
that are as varied as cardiac surgery and hepatitis viral inactivation in
blood products. 187 By 1996, the PTO was issuing nearly 100 medical
procedure patents per month. 188 One particularly egregious patent
consisted of a method of examining an ultrasound for fetal external
genitalia to determine its gender. 189 Dr. John D. Stevens, the
inventor, admitted that the invention depended upon someone having
enough skill to distinguish between male and female genitalia early in
a pregnancy.1 90 Although many doctors had misgivings about patents
on potentially life-saving medical procedure inventions, they were not
galvanized into action until one doctor actually sued another in court
for infringing upon a patent. 191

181. Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862).
182. Morton, 17 F. Cas. at 883.
183. Id. at 884.
184. 24 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 349 (1883); see also DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS
§ 1.03(3) (2005)
185. Exparte Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 108 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954).
186. Rueda, supra note 96, at 125.
187. Id.at 126.
188. Id.
189. See U.S. Patent No. 4,986,274 (filed Dec. 4, 1989) (issued Jan. 22, 1991) ("Fetal
anatomic sex assignment by ultrasonography during early pregnancy").
190. Rueda, supra note 96, at 128-29.
191. Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d 1050, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20824 (D. Vt.
1995). This suit involved a procedure for performing cataract surgeries. The patent at issue,
U.S. Patent No. 5,080,111 (filed June 28, 1990), was eventually found invalid. See Rueda,
supra note 96, at 126-28.
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Largely as a reaction to this litigation, the American Medical
Association (AMA) put pressure on Congress to make it so that
medical procedures could not be patented. In a compromise intended
to placate outraged doctors and worried medical patent holders alike,
Congress amended the patent laws to essentially exempt medical
practitioners and related health care entities from liability for
infringement of a medical procedure patent by a medical
practitioner. 192 This compromise allows doctors to avoid liability
while still allowing the holders of medical procedure patents to go
after deep-pocketed contributory infringers, such as medical device
manufacturers and pharmaceutical companies. 193
Although medical practitioners may be largely immune from
liability for their use of skill-based inventions, the class still extends
into this area. Examples of skill-based medical inventions include:
"Method of treating the skin of a subject"; 194 "Method of tissue legion
removal";195 and "Method of surgically treating scoliosis."1 96 A full

determination of whether these inventions are skill-based would
consider whether the aforementioned procedures would produce
different results based upon the skills of the operating physician. As
discussed supra, the hard cases arise when a possibly independently
useful device is tied to a skill-based procedure.
4. Sports Moves and Related Patents
The validity of a sports move patent has never been litigated and
has consequently received scant attention in the literature. While the
Patent Office Board of Appeals did, in 1942, briefly mention that a
sports move would not be patentable, 19 7 the patentability requirement
has so narrowed since then that some practitioners consider them a

192. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2001).
193. See Todd Martin, Patentability of Methods of Medical Treatment: A Comparitive
Study, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 381, 404-05 (2000) (stating that in any case
medical procedure lawsuits against doctors were rare and claims were usually pursued against
deeper-pocketed defendants).
194. U.S. Patent No. 6,855,117 (filed Aug. 1, 2001) (issued Feb. 15, 2005).
195. U.S. Patent No. 6,855,140 (filed June 6, 2002) (issued Feb. 15, 2005).
196. U.S. Patent No. 6,837,904 (filed Aug. 19, 2002) (issued Jan. 4, 2005).
197. See ExparteMayne, 59 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 342, 344 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1942):
[A] discovery of a new method for solving certain mathematical problems which
are much simpler and shorter than any known method, would not be a proper
subject matter for a patent and this might be said also of the discovery of a new
stroke in swimming or a new maneuver of troops in battle (emphasis added).
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real possibility.198 In reality, there is more than a mere possibility for
such patents, as evidenced by the PTO's issuance of patents on sports
moves. There are numerous patents on techniques for putting a golf
ball, 199 and even one on an exercise method. 200 There is even a
patent on a method of swallowing a pill, 2 0 1 which although not a
sport, is a physical act. The Arena Football League has obtained
another type of sports patent. Not only have they obtained patents on
their game, but also on their playing field. 202

This sort of patent

protection could be used in conjunction with copyright to give owners
extra protection.
Given the expense of litigation, the likelihood that these patents
will ever be litigated is slim to none. 20 3 However, should a sports
move be patented that has the revolutionary effect on a sport similar
to that the Fosbury Flop, the chances of litigation would certainly
204
increase.
Most sports moves are themselves skill-based inventions. For
instance, "Method of putting' 205 and "Method of practicing golf
shots'

'2 °

6 are both skill-based inventions.

The hard cases in sports

moves come when the skill-based invention is tied to a new or
innovative device.

198. See Robert M. Kundstadt et al., Are Sports Moves Next in IP Law?, Nat'l L.J., May
20, 1996, at C2 (arguing that the time is ripe for patents on sports moves).
199. See U.S. Patent No. 5,127,650 (filed July 24, 1991) (issued July 7, 1992) ("Golf putter
and method for putting"); U.S. Patent No. 5,377,987 (filed May 16, 1994) (issued Jan. 3, 1995)
("Golf putter and method for putting"); U.S. Patent No. 5,437,446 (filed Aug. 9, 1994) (issued
Aug. 1, 1995) ("Method for aligning a golf putting stroke"); U.S. Patent No. 5,616,089 (filed
Mar. 29, 1996) (issued Apr. 1, 1997) ("Method of putting").
200. U.S. Patent No. 4,323,232 (filed Sept. 26, 1977) (issued Apr. 6, 1982) ("Exercising
method").
201. U.S. Patent No. 5,643,204 (filed Mar. 15, 1996) (issued July 1, 1997) ("Pill
swallowing device and method").
202. U.S. Patent No. 4,911,443 (filed Sept. 30, 1987) (issued Mar. 27, 1990) ("Football
game system and method of play"). See also, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,419,561 (filed Dec. 17,
1993) (issued May 30, 1995) ("Method of playing golf game on reduced size course"); U.S.
Patent No. 5,682,711 (filed Apr. 25, 1996) (issued Nov. 4, 1997) ("Game field").
203. Where there is between $1 to $25 million at risk, the average patent litigation costs
about $2 million. See Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n, Report of the Economic Survey 22
(2003).
204. The Fosbury Flop is now the standard technique used in high-jumping events. Dick
Fosbury's method was to jump over the bar feet first, whereas prior jumpers had faced forward.
See Jeffrey A. Smith, Comment, It's Your Move-No It's Not! The Application of PatentLaw to
Sports Moves, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1051, 1071-72 (1999).
205. U.S. Patent No. 5,616,089 (filed Mar. 29, 1996) (issued Apr. 1, 1997).
206. U.S. Patent No. 6,712,720 (filed Mar. 11, 2002) (issued Mar. 20, 2004).
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B. BarringPatents on Skill-based Inventions
This section explores how legal doctrine supports the exclusion
of skill-based inventions from patentability. Specifically, skill-based
inventions cannot meet the requirements of a broadly construed
enablement requirement. The first Section explores the contours of
the doctrine surrounding the enablement requirement. The second
Section shows how skill-based inventions cannot satisfy a broad
20 7
construal of this requirement.
1. Enablement Doctrine
The Patent Clause states that "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts" the government is empowered to give
patents to inventors. 208 Thus, the government is empowered to enter
into a quid pro quo relationship wherein society and inventors
exchange inventions for exclusive rights. At the core of this
relationship is the enablement requirement of § 112. In relevant part,
that section states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
20 9
skilled in the art ...to make and use the same.

Early in its history, the Supreme Court noted the importance of
this requirement: "This [enablement requirement] is necessary in
order to give the public, after the privilege shall expire, the advantage
207. This approach could be criticized on the grounds that it calls for a high amount of
judicial activism because it is asking the court to rule on a doctrinal issue in a manner that
comports with the policy objectives of the patent system. Two responses apply to this critique.
The first is that the federal circuit has both the expertise and the obligation to consider policy, so
long as that policy will not take the court outside of the discretion which it is given by the
general language of the patent statutes and the voids that have been left by patent doctrine. This
approach is thoroughly expounded in Burk & Lemley, supra note 92, at 1668-70. The second
and more powerful response (which only applies in a subset of the cases in which the first
response applies) is that it is not activist to construe doctrine in a manner that comports with
policy objectives when the doctrine itself lends itself to such a construal. This is true even if the
construal of the doctrine will have a dramatic effect on the law. Even a ruling that has a
dramatic effect can still be considered a model of judicial restraint so long as it is based on solid
legal grounds. It is possible that the reason that the construal will have such a dramatic effect is
because the patent system has fallen out of step with the correct construal of patent law. After
all, the patent system is influenced not only by the courts but also by the PTO and the patent
lawyers who practice before it. Therefore, it is not true that a court is activist when the court's
doctrinal approach reaches the same result as a policy approach. Instead, it indicates that
Congress has created a well-crafted statute in which legality comports with good policy.
8.
208. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.
209. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2001).
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for which the privilege is allowed, and is the foundation of the power
to issue the patent. '' 210 In order for parity to exist between the
exclusive rights granted to the patentee and the knowledge society has
received, the enablement clause requires "that the public knowledge is
enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate
'2 11
with the scope of the claims."
The formative case dealing with the enablement requirement is
the Supreme Court case of O'Reilly v. Morse.2 12 Professor Morse
invented the American Electro-Magnetic Telegraph, an invention that
revolutionized communication in the early history of the United
States. Though Morse's seminal invention was already by its nature
broad, his claims were broader still. The eighth claim of his patent
claimed any use of electro-magnetism to communicate over long
distances. 2 13 O'Reilly had also invented a similar telegraph and
Morse filed a patent infringement lawsuit. O'Reilly's defense was
that Morse could not possibly have enabled his superbroad invention.
In agreeing with O'Reilly, the Court noted that "Professor Morse has
not discovered, that the electric or galvanic current will always print
at a distance, no matter what may be the form of the machinery or
mechanical contrivances through which it passes."'2 14
This line of reasoning was upheld in In re Fisher.2 15 In that
case, the patentee attempted to claim a hormone preparation having at
least twenty-four amino acids when the only hormone disclosed had
thirty-nine amino acids. 2 16 The patentee also attempted to claim all
potency ratings above a certain threshold for a composition, even
though it had only disclosed compositions with potencies slightly
above that threshold. 2 17 The court rejected the claims, holding that
they were overly broad because they were not matched by the scope
18
of their enablement. 2

210. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 246 (1832).
211. National Recovery Technologies, Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Systems, Inc., 166 F.3d
1190, 1195-96 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("The scope of the claims must be less than or equal to the scope
of the enablement."); see also In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("The scope of
the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided by the
specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.").
212. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854).
213. Seeid. at66.
214. Id.at 117.
215. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
216. Id. at 839.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 839-40.
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In Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. the court
again found this ground to be dispositive. 2 19 Amgen had claimed a
patent on any DNA sequence encoding erythropoietin (EPO) through
recombinant DNA technology. 220 Amgen had disclosed a few
analogs that could make EPO through recombinant DNA
technology. 22 1 The court noted that "[t]he essential question here is
whether the scope of enablement.

. .

is as broad as the scope of the

'222

claim.
Relying on Fisher, the court ruled that Amgen had not
enabled its claim because it had claimed only a few analogs when
countless analogs existed and therefore "Amgen has not enabled
preparation of DNA sequences sufficient to support its all'223
encompassing claims.
Interestingly enough, the court in Amgen linked the standard of
conceptualization of an invention to its enablement. The court noted
that:
[i]t is not sufficient to define [the invention] solely by its principal
biological property, e.g., encoding human erythropoietin, because
an alleged conception having no more specificity than that is
simply a wish to know the identity of any material with that
224
biological property.
The court completed this link in Fiers v. Revel. 225 That case was

an appeal from a three-way priority dispute between Fiers, Revel and
Sugano in which Sugano was awarded priority of an invention for
DNA that encoded for human fibroblast beta-interferon (B-IF).226
Revel had an Israeli application that had the earliest filing date of the
three. In order to rely on its date he needed to demonstrate
enablement as of that date. 2 27

The Board ruled that he could not

prove enablement to the date, however, because his application did
not disclose the nucleotide sequence for the DNA. 22 8 The court
upheld the ruling of the Board, which noted that without full

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Col, Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Id.at 1203.
Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1212.
Id. at 1213.
Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206.
Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Id.at 1166.
Id.at 1169.
Id. at 1170.

42 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 22
disclosure there could not have been conception, and "[l]ogically, one
22 9
cannot... enable an invention that has not been conceived."
Another feature of the enablement doctrine is that it varies
depending upon the predictability of the invented subject matter. In
Fisher, the court also noted that "[i]n cases involving unpredictable
factors, such as most chemical reactions and physiological activity,
the scope of enablement obviously varies inversely with the degree of
unpredictability of the factors involved. '230
This line of reasoning was most notably applied in In re
Wands.23 1
That case involved an invention that provided
immunoassay methods for the detection of hepatitis B using highaffinity monoclonal antibodies. 232 The dispositive question was
whether Wands had enabled the invention by enabling the relevant
antibodies. 23 3 In order to be enabling, Wand's patent application
must have disclosed a method whereby these antibodies could be
'234
obtained without "undue experimentation.
This line of reasoning is not limited to biotechnology cases.
Even in an industry with a reputedly low enablement bar, the federal
circuit has upheld this line of reasoning. In the computer software
case, White ConsolidatedIndustries,Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc.,
White claimed a patent on a numerical control system for machine
tools that could be used on any number of machine tools so long as
the user had the proper translator. 23 5 White had not provided the
translator in the patent. 236 In holding that the patent was not properly
enabled, the court noted that implementing the invention should not
require unreasonable effort or undue experimentation. 237
2. Enablement Requirement Supports Barring Skill-based
Inventions
The enablement doctrine supports barring patents on skill-based
inventions because they cannot properly enable a PHOSITA to use
229. Id. ("[W]hile the court ultimately upheld the ruling of the board, it did so on written
description grounds.") (quoting slip op. at 13).
230. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
231. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
232. Id. at 733.
233. Id. at 736.
234. Id.
235. White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 789
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 791.
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the invention. This failure manifests itself in four ways: first, the
scope of their claims cannot be commensurate with the scope of the
invention because the user's skills are improperly included within the
claim scope; second, whatever description is ultimately given yields
unpredictable results and requires undue experimentation because the
results vary with the skill of the user; third, the patent does not
provide the requisite quid pro quo to society because it fails to
provide those skilled in the art with a specific and useful teaching and
the claim scope is overly broad; fourth, skill-based patents cannot be
properly conceptualized and described by the inventor because the
inventor cannot conceptualize and describe all of the skills necessary
for the invention.
The seminal case of O'Reilly v. Morse explains claim scope in
the context of the enablement requirement. 2 38 In that case, the Court
held that Morse's eighth claim was so broad as to be impossible to
enable. His broad claim attempted to cover every single device using
electromagnetism to communicate over distances. In denying his
claim, the Court noted that his device was only one of many, where
each device was a "complicated and delicate machine[] ... prepared

by the highest mechanical skill."'2 39 For this reason, Morse's claim
was too broad to be enabled. Skill-based inventions all suffer from
this flaw. Each use of a skill-based invention is itself an endeavor
that requires the highest skill level of the user. Furthermore, a patent
disclosure on a skill-based invention can only allow the user to begin
practice on the invention. In contrast, the breadth of the claims
encompasses any use the practitioner might make of the invention, no
matter how skilled.
The Patent Office Board of Appeals addressed the question of
claim scope in Ex parte Mayne.240 That case involved a method for
combating seasickness by focusing on an object. 24 1 The Board noted

that the "these claims cover manifestations of inertia effects through
the sense of feeling, but we are unable to see wherein the sense of
feeling could be employed in any one of the various forms illustrated,
242
and, therefore, the claims are not supported by the disclosure.
238. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
239. Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
240. Exparte Mayne, 59 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 342, 344 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1942).
241. Id.
242. Id. The idea that human judgment does not substitute for the operation of an automatic
machine has also been supported by the federal circuit:
As a matter of law, human judgment exercised by the operator of [the accused]
compounder is a structure neither identical to nor the equivalent of the computer.
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The Board went on in that case to state that the invention at issue was
not patentable because it posed the same patentability problems as a
method for solving certain mathematical problems, or the "discovery
of a new stroke in swimming or a new maneuver of troops in
battle. '24 3 In essence, the Board ruled that skill-based inventions
could not be patented for lack of enablement.
Skill-based inventions are also not patentable because they yield
unpredictable results. The Wands test provides the backdrop against
which inventions can be evaluated for predictability. This test
requires that the invention be useful without requiring undue
experimentation. In Wands the federal circuit propounded eight
factors to make this determination: "(1) the quantity of
experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance
presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the
nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative
skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the
art, and (8) the breadth of the claims." 244 Skill-based patents fail
nearly every factor of this test. They fail the first factor since they
require much experimentation and practice because they rely upon the
skill of the user for their efficacy. They fail the second factor since
they can only provide minimal guidance or direction because a
written disclosure is insufficient to convey the skill necessary to use
the invention. They fail the third factor since working examples are
limited because those examples themselves will vary depending upon
the skill of the examples' creators. They fail the fourth factor because
the nature of skill-based inventions is such that by definition they will
require much experimentation in the form of practice to develop the
skill. They may fail the fifth factor since the prior art for skill-based
inventions may be comprised of other skill-based inventions, which
Davies v. United States, 31 Fed. Ct. Cl. 769, 778-79 (1994) (citing Brown v.
Davis, 116 U.S. 237, 249 ... (1886)). In Davies, the user of the accused device
could manually perform the function which the patent claimed as an automatic
function. Granting summary judgment to the defendant in literal infringement,
the court held that where "a human being substitutes for a part of the claimed
structure," the infringement standard under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6, that the
structure be same as or equivalent to that disclosed in the specification ... is not
met. Davies, 31 Fed. Cl. at 778-79; see also Valley Recreation Prods., Inc. v.
Arachnid, Inc...
36 F.3d 1117... (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 1994) (affirming grant
of summary judgment to defendant on literal infringement, where patent claimed
scoring means requiring human intervention, whereas accused device performed
identical function automatically.)
Clintec Nutrition Co. v. Baxa Corp., 988 F. Supp. 1109, 1115-16 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
243. Exparte Mayne, 59 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 342.
244. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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will themselves require extra experimentation. The seventh and eight
factors provide the strongest arguments. The art is inherently
unpredictable because the nature of skill-based inventions is such that
the results vary directly with the skill of the user. The breadth of their
claims is, by contrast, extremely broad. This combination should be
fatal because in Fisherthe court held that when considering these two
factors together "the scope of enablement obviously varies inversely
245
with the degree of unpredictability of the factors involved."
This construal of the enablement requirement is supported by
congressional intent. In 1930 Congress passed the Plant Patent
Act. 246 Congress knew that plant patents would run afoul of the
enablement requirement because a written description could not
adequately enable one with skill in the art to predictably recreate the
exact varieties of the plants invented. 24 7 Therefore, Congress
specifically built in an exception to the enablement requirement for
plant patents that exempts them from the stringent demands of the
enablement requirement. 24 8 Clearly, Congress understood that the
enablement requirement bars patents that cannot yield predictable
results. Skill-based inventions yield unpredictable results, but unlike
plant patents, they have no statutory exception to forgive their
enablement shortcomings. The Plant Patent Act demonstrates that
Congress did not intend for the enablement requirement to serve only
as a demand for a certain level of disclosure; Congress also intended
it to serve as a freestanding limitation on patentable subject matter
that excludes those inventions for which an enabling disclosure is
impossible.
The reason that the enablement requirement requires that the
claim scope must be commensurate with the enabled invention and
that the invention must yield predictable results is because the
enablement requirement is responsible for ensuring that society is
receiving a benefit from the patent disclosure that is commensurate
Skill-based
with the patent monopoly given to the patentee.
above,
their
As
mentioned
meet
this
requirement.
inventions cannot
claim scope is vastly out of proportion with what they enable. This
problem is compounded by the fact that they yield unpredictable
245. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
246. Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376.
247. See CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 184, § 1.05[l][c] ("This statute recognizes that
in the case of new plant varieties a written description normally cannot serve to enable one with
skill in the art to reproduce exactly the variety.").
248. 35 U.S.C. § 162 (2001) ("No plant patent shall be declared invalid for noncompliance
with section 112 of this title if the description is as complete as is reasonably possible.").
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results. They claim an entire area of skill-based endeavor but cannot
properly enable it to give predictable results. Therefore, they cannot
satisfy the quidpro quo that "is the foundation of the power to issue
'249
the patent.
The federal circuit addressed this relationship in the case of
Genentech Inc. v. Novo Nordisk.25 0 In that case, Genentech attempted
to claim the use of cleavable fusion expression to attain amino acids
of human growth hormone by merely disclosing that the cleavage
process should be used for that purpose. 2 5 1 In rejecting the claim as
not being enabled, the court stated "[w]here ...the claimed invention
is the application of an unpredictable technology in the early stages of
development, an enabling description in the specification must
'252
provide those skilled in the art with a specific and useful teaching.
Skill-based inventions are akin to an unpredictable technology in the
early stages of development. Like the claim in Genentech, the claims
of skill-based inventions only disclose what particular process should
be used, but cannot actually disclose how that process should be used.
Since they cannot disclose a specific and useful teaching, they cannot
be properly enabled.
Genentech also reveals another argument against the enablement
of skill-based inventions. In Fiers v. Revel the court noted that that
which cannot be conceived cannot be enabled. 253 Genentech
attempted to claim a patent on a cleavage process that it knew would
only theoretically work. However, the actual usage of the invention
would require a tremendous amount of refinement. The court denied
Genentech's patent on the grounds that the patentee cannot "bootstrap
a vague statement of a problem into an enabling disclosure sufficient
to dominate someone else's solution of the problem. '254 Skill-based
inventions should be barred for the same reason: they cannot actually
conceive of the skill necessary to use the invention so they bootstrap
an overview of the skill in an attempt to dominate someone else's
skill-based solution to a problem.
Before concluding this Section, it is also important to note that
the enablement requirement is not the only requirement that could
theoretically be used to bar skill-based inventions from patentability.

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218 (1832).
Genentech Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, 108 F.3d 1361, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1367.
See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1366.
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The federal circuit has recently empowered the written description
requirement of § 112, especially in the area of biotechnology. In fact,
in Fiers the federal circuit supported the idea that in the field of
biotechnology the written description requirement must contain a full
and complete description of the DNA itself.255 Another possibility is

the best mode requirement of § 112, which requires the inventor to
disclose the best-known method of using an invention. It is possible
to argue that an inventor can never disclose their best-known method
256
of using a skill-based invention because skills cannot be disclosed.
The federal circuit has been very flexible in its approach to § 112 so it
is not inconceivable that these requirements could be stretched for this
purpose. Numerous scholars have commented on the flexibility of
this requirement in the industries of biotechnology and computer
software. 257 For biotechnology inventions, § 112 applies a very
demanding bar, requiring an extremely high level of disclosure. 258 In
the computer hardware industry the requirement is reversed. The
259
source code of patented programs need not even be disclosed.
Although both of these alternative approaches could theoretically
work, they would require the federal circuit to take a large step in
evolving the doctrine for that purpose. In contrast, the enablement
requirement as it exists now already supports the exclusion of skillbased inventions. As Judge Rader noted in his dissent in Enzo
Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., the enablement requirement is "the
most important patent doctrine after obviousness. '2 60 He went on to
note that the enablement requirement "has many important

255. See Fiers, 984 F2d at 1170.
256. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2001).
257. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology Specific, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002); Amir A. Naini, Convergent Technologies and
Divergent Patent Validity Doctrines: Obviousness and Disclosure Analysis in Software and
Biotechnology, 86 J. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 541, 542-43 (2004); Janice M.
Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological
Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 616-17 (1998); Margaret Sampson, Comment, The
Evolution of the Enablement and Written DescriptionRequirements Under 35 U.S.C. 112 in tle
Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1235-56 (2000).
258. See, e.g., Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1170-71 (adequate written description of DNA requires
literal disclosure of DNA's makeup); Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly, 119
F.3d 1559, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (functional description of genetic material is not adequate
disclosure).
259. See, e.g., Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 941-43 (Fed. Cir.
1990); Fonar Corp. v. General Electric Company, 107 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 908 (1997).
260. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
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applications. Beyond mere adequacy of disclosure, it serves as the
line of demarcation between the visionary theorist[s] ([who] add
nothing to the useful arts) and the visionary pioneer[s] ([who]
contribute to the useful arts)."' 26 1 While there are many alternative
grounds upon which skill-based inventions could be barred, none
seems as well suited for the task as the enablement requirement.
3. Barring Gatekeeper Inventions
The enablement requirement also supports the exclusion of those
patents that act only as gatekeepers to skill-based inventions because
they have no independent utility. As part of the quidpro quo that is at
the heart of the patent bargain, an invention cannot be enabled if does
not have utility.262 The federal circuit has elaborated on this
relationship in the case of In re Cortright. That case involved an
invention that supposedly cured baldness. 263 The court noted the
relationship of the enablement and utility requirements:
If the written description fails to illuminate a credible utility, the
PTO will make both a section 112, 1 rejection for failure to teach
how to use the invention and a section 101 rejection for lack of
utility ....This dual rejection occurs because '[t]he how to use
prong of section 112 incorporates as a matter of law the
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 that the specification disclose as a
matter of fact a practical utility ....264

The utility requirement holds that "[w]hoever invents ...any
new and useful.. . composition of matter ...may obtain a patent

261. Id.
262. See, e.g., In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Obviously, if a claimed
invention does not have utility, the specification cannot enable one to use it.").
263. In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
264. Id. at 1356. See also In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000):
To satisfy the enablement requirement of § 112, p. 1, a patent application must
adequately disclose the claimed invention so as to enable a person skilled in the
art to practice the invention at the time the application was filed without undue
experimentation. The utility requirement of§ 101 mandates that the invention be
operable to achieve useful results. Thus, if the claims in an application fail to
meet the utility requirement because the invention is inoperative, they also fail to
meet the enablement requirement because a person skilled in the art cannot
practice the invention.
See also Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
accord Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("Considering the structural complexity of the EPO gene, the manifold possibilities for change
in its structure, with attendant uncertainty as to what utility will be possessed by these analogs,
we consider that more is needed [for enablement].").
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therefore . . . . 265 The seminal case on the utility requirement is
Brenner v. Manson.266 In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that an
inventor could not patent a new steroid compound without disclosing
a use for that compound. 26 7 In arriving at this decision, the court
began from the proposition that the utility requirement, not unlike the
enablement requirement, is based upon the "basic quid pro quo
contemplated by the Constitution. '26 8 The Court then noted that this
quid pro quo is "derived by the public from an invention with
substantial utility.

'269

The Court defined substantial utility as

270
existing "where specific benefit exists in currently available form."
Patents on inventions that act primarily as gatekeepers to skillbased inventions should be barred on dual enablement/utility grounds
because they cannot confer any specific benefit. Since the only
purpose of these inventions is to create a monopoly on skill-based
inventions that are inherently unpredictable, then gatekeeper
inventions cannot confer any specific benefit. The Court has noted:
"a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but
compensation for its successful conclusion. '[A] patent system must
be related to the world of commerce rather than to the realm of
philosophy.' ' 27 1 The Court wisely cautioned that patents on such
inventions "may confer power to block off whole areas of scientific
development, without compensating benefit to the public. '2 72
Therefore, the Court recommended that "[u]nless and until a process
is refined and developed to this point-where specific benefit exists
in currently available form-there is insufficient justification for
permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad
field." 273
CONCLUSION

It should always be kept in mind that the main driving force
behind innovation is the competitive free market. Patents act a
double-edged sword in this market: they can help spur innovation by
allowing inventors to appropriate gains from inventions in return for
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).
Brenner, Comm'r of Patents v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
Id.at 535.
Id. at 534.
Id.
Id.
Brenner, Comm'r of Patents, 383 U.S. at 536 (citations omitted).
Id. at 534.
Id. at 534-35.
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disclosing inventions, but they can also create harmful monopolies
that stifle competition. Accordingly, changes in the patent laws
should only be made after a careful consideration of their effects on
competition. Following this mandate, this Article argues that allowing
patents on skill-based inventions will have harmful effects on
competition.
Denying patents on these inventions is no easy task. Clever
applicants can twist patent applications until they conform to the
patent laws. However, using the tests delineated herein skill-based
inventions should be readily separable from their non-skill based
counterparts. Still there will be gray areas where the federal circuit
will have to use their expertise to set the correct boundaries. An
amount of discretion will have to exist but this is inevitable since
perfectly rigid patent laws will never be able to bar cleverly morphing
patent applications. 274 The benefit derived from excluding skill-based
inventions will strongly outweigh the harm caused by the uncertainty
that will result from the gray areas surrounding this category.
As more and more skill-based inventions make their way into the
patent system the issue of their validity is likely to come before the
federal circuit. The natural contours of the enablement requirement
support the exclusion of skill-based inventions from the realm of
This exclusion will help align patent law with
patentability.
competition policy.

274. See John R. Thomas, Formalismat the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774
(2003) ("Bright-line rules may prevent the fine-tuning needed to reach individualized judgments
and instead encourage behavior to the boundaries of prohibited conduct.").

